Results-Driven Federalism Part 2

            Consider the following assertion:

            “Our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the federal government, such that sovereignty rests concurrently with both the federal government and the States. Specifically, the Tenth Amendment reserves all powers not specifically delegated to the federal government by the Constitution to the States or to the people.  Thus, States are not creations of the central government. They are separate sovereigns. This distribution of sovereignty, otherwise known as federalism, is the defining feature of the relationship between the federal and state governments.

            In taking this step [preempting states from limiting the geographical reach of municipal broadband networks] the FCC usurps fundamental aspects of state sovereignty. And it disrupts the balance of power between the federal government and state governments that lies at the core of our constitutional system of government.”

            Now, compare it with the following:

“The broader problem is that California’s micromanagement poses a risk to the rest of the country.  After all, broadband is an interstate service; Internet traffic doesn’t recognize state lines.  It follows that only the federal government can set regulatory policy in this area.  For if individual states like California regulate the Internet, this will directly impact citizens in other states.

            Among other reasons, this is why efforts like California’s are illegal.” 

            Would you be surprised if I reported that the same person wrote both declarations?  Any dismay at the apparent inconsistency if I reported that the author is FCC Chairman Ajit Pai?  Compare file:///C:/Users/rmf5/Downloads/FCC-15-25A5.pdf with https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-pai-remarks-maine-policy-heritage-center.

            Chairman Pai is a quite knowledgeable and talented guy.  However, I believe his partisanship creates inconsistency on a fundamental principal—what he terms  “Constitutional Law 101.”

            Chairman Pai railed against the Democratic majority at the FCC which sought to preempt state governments from imposing geographical restrictions on municipal government broadband networks.  For this matter, the Chairman invoked federalism as sacrosanct: states are sovereign entities free to determine whether and how subordinate governmental units can pursue broadband service initiatives. 

            Chairman Pai had supporting case precedent including a Supreme Court case validating the right of states to prohibit any municipal telecommunications service.  See Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004).  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals validated his legal interpretation ruling that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not explicitly authorize the FCC to elevate the goal of ubiquitous and affordable broadband over state sovereignty, even the sovereign election to foreclose municipal efforts to rollout broadband where commercial ventures had refused to serve. See Tennessee v. FCC, 832 F.3d 597 (6^th Cir. 2016)available at: http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0189p-06.pdf.

            With all this support for state’s rights, how does Chairman Pai reverse course and invoke much maligned federal preemption to thwart states like California from enacting network neutrality laws? 

            Results-driven rationales now support the view that anything and everything about broadband is interstate in nature, and fair game for FCC preemption, except of course legislated service limitations.  I cannot square this view with what Chairman Pai has previously stated. 

            California enacts a law, which I consider quite flawed, but clearly representative of a sovereign state keen on imposing consumer safeguards for the origination and termination of Internet traffic within the state.  Internet Service Providers may import content from other states, but the delivery medium surely lies within a single state.

            Note that in the case of California network neutrality legislation, a sovereign state has opted to impose safeguards that the FCC considers unnecessary and potentially harmful.  Can the FCC preempt states on grounds that they cannot lawfully act when the Commission determines that regulatory oversight is not needed?

            How did humility and respect for states’ rights evaporate?

Result-Driven Federalism: How the FCC Rationalizes the Lawfulness of Preemption

          

            The current FCC pushes the federal preemption envelope, currently with an initiative to further constrain states and municipalities from regulating and requiring payment for wireless antenna installations on public property.  See https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-353962A1.pdf.  Once upon a time, Republicans deeply respected the concept of federalism: deference to state rights and reticence to extend the wingspan of federal oversight and interference.  Such regulatory humility evaporates when preemption achieves countervailing goals.  

            For wireless antenna site policy, the FCC majority sees the need to preempt greedy non-federal governments who want to extort money from wireless carriers.  Apparently, the goal of preventing outrageous rent extraction and delays in authorizing national security enhancing 5^th Generation wireless justifies aggressive preemption, despite clear language in the Communications Act mandating shared jurisdiction.

            I can appreciate that some city councils, in particular, might look at wireless tower site authorization as a cash cow.  I can anticipate that some municipalities might try to extort outrageous payments and use the prospect of delay as negotiating leverage.  But I also can see wireless carriers using the FCC as lead blockers to beat municipalities and their citizens into submission.  What’s good for a wireless carrier must be good for society, right?  Tower siting decision making has nothing to do about aesthetics and respecting history and everything to do about ripping off big, bad corporations.

            Antenna siting has become a contentious issue, because of an ever increasing number of needed locations.  The migration to 5^th Generation wireless service will trigger a massive increase in antenna sites, because new technologies have smaller “footprints” requiring more antenna installations.  This matter is all about money, but conflicting interpretations of federalism partially obscure this reality.

            Money and serving different constituencies force FCC regulators to abandon any semblance of jurisprudential consistency.  In this strange time, a political party predisposed to support federalism and reliant on the Federalist Society to vet judicial candidates, has to turn its back on a baseline and fundamental philosophical construct.  Republican FCC Commissioners want largely to preempt states and municipalities from economic regulation of wireless tower sites, but they rallied around the state’s right flag when their Democratic counterparts wanted to preempt state laws prohibiting the installation or expansion of Wi-Fi and other broadband networks.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the argument that Congress did not sufficiently articulate a federal mandate of supporting broadband technology deployment and preventing laws, regulations and policies that thwart this goal.  See http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0189p-06.pdf.

            Reasonable people can disagree agreeably about the breadth, reach and scope of the FCC’s jurisdiction.  What I can’t tolerate is the sanctimony and righteous indignation of federalist advocates who readily ignore the principle when favored stakeholders knock on their door.

             

8th Circuit Rules VoIP an Information Service

            By a 2-1 vote, the 8^th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court’s determination that Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) telephone service constitutes an information service subject to FCC preemption of state regulation. [1] The court decided to make an explicit determination considering the FCC’s decades long disinclination to do, because an explicit information service classification would jeopardize the Commission’s ability to regulate VoIP service and perhaps also the lawfulness of requiring subscribers to contribute to universal service funding.  On the other hand, the decision bolsters the FCC’s selective assertion of federal preemption to prevent inconsistent and “balkanized” policies when state establish their own regulations.

            The court determined that VoIP falls within the information service classification, because a protocol conversion occurs when calls originate, or terminate on the conventional public switched telephone network, but are transmitted via broadband networks:

            We conclude that the VoIP technology used by Charter Spectrum is an “information service” under the Act. As the district court put it, “the touchstone of the information services inquiry is whether Spectrum Voice acts on the consumer’s information—here a phone call—in such a way as to ‘transform’ that information.” 259 F.Supp.3d at 987; see 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). IP-TDM calls involve just such a transformation. For those calls, because information enters Charter’s network “in one format (either IP or TDM, depending on who originated the call) and leaves in another, its system offers ‘net’ protocol conversion, which the FCC has defined as occurring when ‘an end-user [can] send information into a network in one protocol and have it exit the network in a different protocol.’” [2]

            The court majority opted to consider the explicit language in the definitions of telecommunications service and information service rather than consider the functional equivalency of VoIP with earlier vintage circuit-switched telephony, even though they use different technical protocols.  The court considered the information service category as applicable because VoIP service providers must use software to convert the format of calls from and to legacy wired and wireless telephone networks even though both telecommunications services and information services use telecommunications networks to transmit and deliver traffic:

            Spectrum Voice’s service is an information service because it “mak[es] available information via telecommunications” by providing the capability to transform that information through net protocol conversion. Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 988 (2005) (explaining that “all information-service providers . . . use ‘telecommunications’ to provide consumers with [their] service”). [3]

            The court did not consider VoIP protocol conversion as fitting within three categories where some processing takes place, but not in a significant way that fundamentally changes the nature and composition of the composite service. [4] This view parallels the analysis contained in the FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom order which reclassified broadband access as an information service thereby removing common carrier regulatory oversight.

            The court quickly rejected as inapplicable each of the three carve-outs that the FCC uses to allow some degree of information processing without converting a basic telecommunications service into information service. The court rejected the first exception, because VoIP connects users of a service and not users with a network.  The second exception was considered inapplicable, because the court emphasized that protocol conversions are necessary for new equipment that VoIP subscribers must use even though more broadly the conversions also promote compatibility and interconnection between users of legacy voice telephone services and newer VoIP options.

            The third exception also was considered inapplicable, but some stakeholder may dispute the court’s rationale that emphasizes the need for protocol conversions to make the required new equipment function on customers’ premises.  The court briefly stated that the required customer premises equipment is not physically a part of the VoIP provider’s network, nor does its protocol conversion occur within a network. By emphasizing the location of the device performing the protocol conversion, the court could ignore that the device provides internetworking between two types of networks that consumers consider functionally equivalent.

            Judge Grasz, in dissent, rejected the majority’s rationale noting that the court overemphasized the location where protocol conversions take place and in so doing possibly provided a way for telecommunications service providers to evade most of the FCC’s regulatory oversight for any service where a device can be installed on consumer premises:

            If performing the conversion from TDM to IP inside a customer’s home is sufficient to convert a telecommunications service into an information service, then AT&T, or any similarly situated provider, could greatly reduce its regulatory burden simply by moving converter boxes inside customers’ homes. A simple change of physical location would transform what used to be telecommunications services to information services. This may explain why the FCC has yet to make categorical pronouncements on protocol conversions. An overarching category for all net protocol conversions would create a potential pathway for every company to escape the heavier telecommunications service regulations. [5]

            Judge Grasz also noted language in the definition of telecommunication service that deemphasizes the type and location of facilities used to provide a telecommunications service. [6] He even rejects the possibility that VoIP protocol conversions can trigger the information service classification, because the broadband service venture provides a telecommunication transmission link and the protocol conversion does not change the nature of voice communications between the caller and call recipient:

If we assume that interconnected VoIP services “provide” “telecommunications” as defined in statute, then we must presume that no “change” occurs between the two phone sets on either end of the interconnected VoIP line. . . . As a result, when addressing the question of whether Charter’s media gateway transforms information, in order to rule in favor of Charter, we would have to conclude that a device that does not change the form or content of information (because it is part of telecommunications) is also a device that transforms information (because it is an information service). See id. § 153(24), (50). The first conclusion forecloses the second one. In short, if Charter’s service provides telecommunications (as defined in statute), then its net protocol conversion cannot be part of an information service, but instead must be part of a telecommunications service. [7]

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[1]           Charter Advanced Services(MN), LLC v. Lang, No. 17-2290, slip op. (8^th Cir. Sep. 7, 2018); available at: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/09/172290P.pdf.

[2]              Id. at 6.

[3]              Id. at 7.

[4]              “The definition of ‘information service’ excludes services that comprise a ‘capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.’ 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). The FCC has further defined this exception to include ‘(1) services ‘involving communications between an end user and the network itself (e.g., for initiation, routing, and termination of calls) rather than between or among users;’ (2) protocol processing ‘in connection with the introduction of a new basic network technology (which requires protocol conversion to maintain compatibility with existing [CPE])’ and (3) services ‘involving internetworking (conversions taking place solely within the carrier’s network to facilitate provision of a basic network service, that result in no net conversion to the end user).’” Id. at 7-8.

[5]              Judge Grasz dissent at 11.

[6]           “The statute contemplates such transitions because it defines a telecommunications service as ‘offering [] telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . . . regardless of the facilities used.” Id. at 10 citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(53).

[7]              Id. at 12.

The Ambivalently Federalist FCC

            With all this talk about draining the Washington, D.C. swamp and its entrenched federal government occupants, the FCC remains quite enamored with federal preemption of state and local initiatives. I cannot see a coherent rationale for depriving non-federal actors of their role as laboratories for innovative regulation and better, on-site agents.  Instead, the FCC--with increasing frequency--seems to embrace preemption more often than deference to states and municipalities.

            On the federalist side, Chairman Ajit Pai fiercely endorsed the right of states to regulate inmate intrastate calling rates, even if the rates reach extortionate levels.  The Chairman gladly defers to states that have enacted barriers or prohibitions on municipal Wi-Fi and fiber optic networks.  

            On the federal preemption side, both Democratic and Republican majorities at the FCC frequently foreclose state and local initiatives.  Sometimes preemption prevents extortionate behavior, such as when cities delay or condition market entry.  But other times, I wonder if the FCC takes a partisan stance rather than a principled one.

            I am onboard when the FCC attempts to expedite state and local administrative procedures in granting franchises, access to rights of way and necessary permits.  However, the FCC also wants to constrain, if not prohibit, non-federal involvement in such diverse matters as privacy, universal service funding and tower siting.  

            If state and local regulators are closer to the people and perhaps better versed in the issues, why is the FCC so keen on preventing them for serving?

Federalism Versus Balkanization and Muni Wi-Fi

         While most attention today focused on the FCC’s Open Internet, I was intrigued with the discussion—make that righteous indignation—presented by Commission’s Pai on the FCC’s partial preemption of state laws restricting territorial build outs by municipal Wi-Fi networks.  Commissioner Pai gave an extensive review of Constitutional law with emphasis on state sovereignty.

          Commissioner Pai never addressed the considerable body of case precedent favoring FCC preemption of state regulation, including the attempt by state public utility commissions to regulate—if not prohibit-Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”).  See Minn. PSC v. FCC, 394 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2004).  States’ rights notwithstanding, many courts share the FCC’s view that much in telecommunications and now the Internet involve interstate commerce. 99.9999999+ percent of the time, Internet traffic crosses a state border.  Over the years, such a crossing “contaminated” any pure intrastate link which arguably includes the wireless few feet linking a tablet and the Internet cloud.

          Not so long ago Commissioners of both parties would express concern about “balkanization” of telecommunications policy, i.e., fragmentation and proliferation of many inconsistent state policies.  That environment would generate “regulatory uncertainty” and “disincentives for investment in next generation networks.”  Now Commissioners and others earn brownie points for how well they can express fealty to the Constitution.

          An ignored but obvious issue in the debate lies in the vast increase in scrutiny and involvement in telecommunications policy by groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council.  The real possibility exists that ALEC offered state legislators in places like North Carolina and Tennessee a template for a law few framed as pro-market/pro-state.  Might state legislators have voted for something without much analysis?

          In any event I saw a huge irony in the universal view that America needs more competition in broadband, but Commission Pai’s insistence that municipalities do not count, even when no one else seems “incentivized” to make the effort.