Despite
ample and longstanding case precedent, the Supreme Court appears ready to prevent
regulatory agencies from acting when a statutory mandate is ambiguous and
outdated.
The Court appears ready to prevent regulatory agencies from “changing
its mind” about the proper scope of regulation, either to increase, or decrease
oversight.
The Court’s
conservative super majority wants to reverse its Chevron Doctrine that conditionally
supports judicial deference to the expertise resident in agencies such as the
Federal Communications Commission. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference. Additionally, the Court wants to deem off
limits any issue that constitutes something so important that Congress must
legislate. See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022); https://law.stanford.edu/publications/testing-the-major-questions-doctrine/.
This means
that if Congress does not enact timely clarifications and updates to a law, regulatory
agencies cannot “fill in the blanks.” If the FCC and other agencies cannot act,
doesn’t this mean that they cannot establish new rules and regulations, but also
they cannot deregulate, despite changed circumstances?
Does it
also foreclose actions by both Democratic and Republican majorities to alter a
regulatory regime by changing what Communications Act Title applies? Having
done so previously, the FCC recently restored the application of Title II telecommunications
service, common carrier to Internet access. https://www.fcc.gov/document/promoting-fast-open-and-fair-internet,
¶153-186.
I hope this
Court will not attempt a textual analysis of original statutory intent to establish
the basis only for regulatory agency abandonment (but not new, or renewed
application) of a statutory mandate, absent congressional authorization.
If the Court
wants to endorse unilateral, unauthorized deregulation, then it will have to reverse
another longstanding case precedent that prevented the FCC from removing
telecommunications common carrier tariffing requirements in light of
marketplace dynamics favoring more facilities-based competition and less
regulation. See MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/512/218/.
In a
decision written by Justice Scalia, a far more principled Supreme Court in 1994
did not allow a Democratic majority FCC to “jump the gun” with a deregulatory initiative
that contradicted a clear statutory mandate: “It is effectively the
introduction of a whole new regime of regulation (or of free-market
competition), which may well be a better regime but is not the one that
Congress established.” 512 U.S. at 234.
The Court
properly decided that Congress had to act and it did so in a timely manner.
Sadly, the current gridlocked congress has little likelihood of enacting
essential statutory revisions.
Unless the
Court comes up with a clever and undisciplined roadmap for unilateral
deregulatory initiatives, while prohibiting new rules and regulations, agencies
like the FCC will become powerless to make deregulatory, regulatory, or
re-regulatory actions.
Now that
would be job killing, investment thwarting, and innovation stifling.