The conservative majority in the Supreme Court has
worked tirelessly to prevent regulatory agencies from using their expertise to
assess how changed circumstances affect statutory authority. See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024); available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf;
(overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/837/.
While I appreciate that the FCC can
overreach, I worry that the Court has blithely ignored two serious problems it
has created:
1) It looks like the impact of non-deference
forecloses even independent regulatory agencies, like the FCC, from interpreting
laws that Congress did not, or could not future proof. For example, the last major amendment to baseline
telecommunications law occurred in 1996, with no assessment of how broadband
and the Internet fundamentally change information, communications, and entertainment
markets.
Rather than defer to the FCC’s
interpretation of ambiguous statutory authorization, the Court requires
explicit and properly tailored legislation.
Congress has developed a loathsome reputation for not assessing what
legislative amendments and additions are necessary and overdue. If Congress predictably fails to act, then
obsolete and quite probably harmful statutory language persists.
2) Court appears more inclined to use
non-deference as a basis for preventing regulatory agencies from expanding jurisdiction
to address new and potentially severe quandaries. It is easy to reverse an expansive or
re-regulatory initiative as the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals did in its
rejection of the Democratic majority FCC’s effort to interpret broadband access
as a telecommunications service. See https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0002p-06.pdf.
Going forward, will courts apply non-deference
to regulatory expansion clearly responding to a problem, which not addressed
would trigger severe, quantifiable harm?
For example, the FCC has limited and
ambiguous authority to assess the environmental impacts of telecommunications
service providers. See https://www.fcc.gov/general/nepa-faq.
Reviewing courts and sponsored advocates already consider the scope of FCC space
environment oversight quite limited, See, e.g., https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1337/22-1337-2024-07-12.html;
https://techfreedom.org/fcc-lacks-statutory-authority-and-expertise-for-outer-space-activities/,
despite the irrefutable fact that spacecraft reentry has significant, adverse
impact on the earth’s atmosphere and the pace of global warming. See, e.g., https://indico.esa.int/event/493/timetable/?view=standard_inline_minutes.
Would
any reviewing court affirm a decision of the FCC to expand its regulatory
oversight and require space ventures to assess the environmental impact of its vastly
expanded launch and spacecraft vaporization activities? I do not think so, particularly for any
venture led by Elon Musk. See https://ehtrust.org/federal-court-rules-in-favor-of-fcc-space-x-can-launch-thousands-of-satellites-without-environmental-review/
What court would risk being overturned by the Supreme
Court for considering it rational and consistent with statutory authority for
the FCC to make some assessment of the impact on earth from toxic emissions above?