$1000 vs. $6.84 Million

     The California Public Utilities Commission has scheduled a series of workshops to explore the consequences of AT&T Wireless’ acquisition of T-Mobile.  I have received an invitation to participate, but my professorial travel budget cannot defray the $1000 or so it would cost.  Contrast that expense with reports that AT&T spent $ 6.48 million in the last three months on lobbying.  See http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/ctia-att-boost-lobbying-spending-q1/2011-07-01.

     Had I participated I would have made the following points.

     AT&T Wireless and T-Mobile want this deal, because they believe it will enhance shareholder value in their respective parent companies.  AT&T acquires more market share the easy way without much enhancement to its value proposition to consumers.  T-Mobile customers get the opportunity to make and receive “free” calls on the AT&T network, but on service plans offered in an even less competitive market.

     AT&T Wireless eliminates a competitor, and acquires T-Mobile’s spectrum, towers and other assets.  For its part T-Mobile gets to cash out of its U.S. investment having lost confidence that the company can compete with the AT&T and Verizon who over time have boosted their market share and consolidated control over the wireless market, including a strong negotiating posture with handset manufacturers.

     Like it or not the acquiring company bears a burden of proving that the venture serves the public interest, or more realistically causes little harm.  AT&T bears this obligation, because the company voluntarily has chosen to operate a business that uses spectrum—auctioned and freely granted—and provides service as a type of public utility known as a common carrier.  Rather than confiscate private assets, federal and state governments have lawful authority to require common carriers to operate in the public interest including duties to provide service on fair terms and conditions, not always set by an unfettered marketplace.

     AT&T has spent billions writing scripts for stakeholders and decision makers identifying all the anticipated public benefits accruing from the deal.  The company claims that the acquisition will expedite wireless broadband to rural areas, solve spectrum shortages caused by the failure of the FCC to reallocate more of this essential resource for commercial mobile services and overall enhance (or at least not harm) competition.  AT&T has experienced no difficulty in paying for the services of academics--some friends and colleagues of mine--to assert these benefits, albeit with very little science and empirical proof.

     Rather than join the queue and supplement a fund for my kids’ college educations I have undertaken the role of challenging the conventional wisdom among stakeholders and the FCC.  I want the FCC and state public utility commissions to collect empirical evidence about the consequences of this and other acquisitions.  Armed with that kind of material decision makers have a better chance at assessing what will change, or stay the same.  In a market already dominated by four  national carriers serving more than 90% of all subscribers in the U.S., regulators have to confirm that this deal will not trigger such consolidation as to accord AT&T Wireless and Verizon duopoly power.

     When two ventures share about 80% of the market there is great risk that they can affect the price, terms and conditions on which consumers access both wireless service and the devices that access service.  As the smart phone will become the third and dominant screen for information, communications and entertainment (“ICE”) regulators have to stand vigilant against allowing ventures to pursue transactions that make it easier for them to compete and innovate less.

     Already the U.S. wireless marketplace shows signs of lackluster competition and innovation.  A prospective customer would find little difference in the price points and service terms offered by the four national carriers.  These carriers have a reputation for imposing restrictions on service including what subscribers can do with their smartphones.  By locking consumers into a two year service contract, with significant early termination fees, wireless carriers reduce customer churn, but also stifle the flexibility and versatility of handsets.  Rather than becoming the equivalent of a wireless computer—as they are in most nations—handsets in the U.S. are locked by carriers who disable features installed by handset manufacturers and limit what subscribers can do with their handsets.

     Throughout my professional and academic career I have examined many out of the headline aspects of the telecommunications marketplace with an eye toward determining whether and how carriers compete.  Increasingly the terms and conditions by which carriers interconnect their networks affect the value consumers can accrue from access as well as the commercial viability of specific carriers.  AT&T Wireless and Verizon clearly understand that they can leverage market power to extract financial and operational concessions, or to bolster their dominance. 
     For example the FCC has stated that these two carriers have refrained from executing data roaming agreements with independent carriers largely because the absence of such an agreement creates a major and growing incentive for consumers to take service from a nationwide carrier.  So a common carrier providing both telecommunications and information services can leverage its unregulated, non-common carrier status to assert the right not to interconnect with other carriers.

     AT&T also has a strategy to disadvantage competitors who need wireline services to “backhaul” wireless voice and data traffic.  In light of the absence of robust competition for these so-called middle mile and special access services, companies such as AT&T and Verizon can price service at rates several multiples above other more competitive services.  For wireless carriers lacking a wireline corporate affiliate having an extensive national middle mile and backhaul network, incumbent carriers which combine both types of networks achieve a market boost in two ways: 1) the scale economies of having an integrated wireless and wireline network; and 2) the ability to demand extraordinarily profitable middle mile and backhaul rates.     
     Until quite recently the FCC summarily concluded that all telecommunications service markets were sufficiently competitive as to eliminate the need for regulatory scrutiny to prevent price squeezes and other anticompetitive practices where a carrier, such as AT&T can competitively disadvantage a competitor by offering retail rates below the wholesale or special access rate charged competing carriers.

     AT&T Wireless’ proposed acquisition comes at a time when incumbent carriers have launched an unprecedented campaign to convince legislators, judges and the public that regulation costs jobs, stifles innovation and handicaps competition.  I see this well funded initiative as causing just the opposition.  Has there ever been a merger or acquisition that did  not trigger a reduction in employment, at least in the short term, as one of the positive enhancements to efficiency?  What handset manufacturer will risk the displeasure of two customers representing 80% of market by offering handset innovations and features that these two carriers do not want subscribers to have.  Bear in mind that AT&T Wireless and Verizon initially disabled and later conditioned what subscribers could do with wi-fi access.  The carriers relented possibly because they realized that rather than adversely impact revenues, wi-fi access offloads traffic onto other networks, rather than tax the ability of their wireless network to handle growing demand.

      Lastly how competitive can a market be when four carriers have a 90% market share and the proposed acquisition would vest the top two carriers with an 80% share?  Consider this deal in the context of the commercial aviation business in the U.S.   How would consumers and the Justice Department respond if American Airlines, the number two air carrier, proposed to merge with Delta, the number four carrier having recently merged with Northwest?  Unlike aviation where all carriers have to negotiate runway access with an unaffiliated venture, in the wireless business a single carrier can control the runway, air craft, air traffic control and the commercial terms for transferring customers and their baggage.

     The AT&T acquisition of T-Mobile raises a variety of questions the companies simply do not want authorities to ask and answer.

AT&T Aquisition of T-Mobile Will Cure the Common Cold!

Give AT&T Wireless credit for enlisting widespread support for its proposed acquisition of T-Mobile.  Disparate players including the Communications Workers of America union, Wall Street and its Journal, and various e-commerce vendors support the deal.  With or without a provided script from AT&T, these endorsers see the merger as expediting progress (however defined) and making AT&T a better competitor of Verizon.  The CWA curiously projects the merger as creating lots of new jobs, despite the fact that a merger typically achieves “operational efficiency” through consolidation, e.g., fewer advertising agency contracts and bricks and mortar stores.

So let me get this straight: AT&T will have the ability to do things that it cannot do now even with the deal requiring the company to pony up a substantial amount of cash that otherwise might have been allocated for new towers and service improvement.  AT&T will expedite wireless broadband deployment in rural areas, despite the fact that there is no spectrum scarcity in these areas and nothing currently prevents AT&T from using its ample, existing rural spectrum to provide improved service. In rural areas the company need only divide existing cell contours by installing new towers and cell sites.

This deal probably will happen, with a blend of AT&T “voluntary concessions” and the inability or unwillingness of decision makers to subject assertions both pro and con to rigorous analysis.  It is far easier for the FCC to forecast or project possible positive or negative consequences triggered by the acquisition than to quantify likely outcomes.  So long as stakeholders can make bold assertions, without having to provide anything substantive and scientific to support them, the FCC can largely pick and choose what assertions will support the Commission’s ultimate decision.  

The FCC does not have to explain just how the deal will or will not reduce, or increase employment and competition.  If you examine the dozens of deals examined by the FCC, you would not see heavy math, or deep science.  The Commission largely reiterates what the stakeholders claim without much critical analysis.

So in this anxious time, an acquisition that certainly will further concentrate the wireless industry miraculously will increase employment in the sector, solve the digital divide, promote competition and cure the common cold.  Who needs answers to why AT&T Wireless requires the assets of an ineffectual competitor to achieve progress it cannot now accrue?  And why wonder about a deal that simply reallocates spectrum to a company that already has ample existing spectrum in the 700 MHz band not yet used?

Internet in a Suitcase Abroad, But What About Pennsylvania?

The New York Times has a front page article on U.S. governmental efforts to support democracy via stealthy data networking in strive torn areas abroad.  See http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/12internet.html.

So the good guys might have ways to get the message out when the bad guys erect fire walls, or disable incumbent networks.  What’s not to like about such empowering technologies?

But the prospect of broadband in warring regions throughout the world got me thinking about broadband access in my home town, centrally located in the middle of nowhere—State College, PA, home of Penn State University.  Ironically those freedom loving patriots probably have better wireless access than I have.  Worse yet a certain incumbent carrier—threatened by the prospect of taxpayer underwritten, or tax favored municipal wireless networks—managed to convince the easily lobbied Pennsylvania legislature to grant it a right of first refusal on any wireless network with the exception of Philadelphia.  So whatever momentum might evolve to support citizen empowering wireless broadband has the cloud of litigation whether the right exists to even try to build a wireless network.

In Afghanistan and elsewhere shadow wireless networks pop up with U.S. governmental support.  But here in Pennsylvania a cloud of another sort frustrates wireless development thanks to an incumbent carrier claiming but not necessarily exercising “dibs” on wireless networking.  

Creative Lawyering

            Believe it or not you can enhance your lobbying and legal practice before the FCC with the use of creative thinking.  No fooling.  Let me provide you with an example.

            Say you’re a major wireless carrier that for five or more years has unlawfully generated $52 million in false billing for data sessions that did not trigger any downloads and usually occurred because of a poorly designed handset button.  Finally the FCC acts and orders a refund.  The pragmatist wing might accept a fine and use the episode to exemplify how responsive and  public-minded the company is.

            But the creative wing might try this strategy.  The FCC’s information service classification offers the carrier a deregulated “safe harbor” for wireless broadband data access.  The Comcast case supports the conclusion that the FCC has no jurisdiction to regulate the wireless carrier’s data services, including overbilling.  $52 million could mean the difference between a minor bonus and a really nice Christmas.  Hang tough management.  The FCC can’t lay a hand on us!  Just as we’re appealing the FCC’s attempt to impose common carrier roaming access for data service, so should we refuse to pay any fine or enter into a Consent Decree on the matter of data access billing irregularities.  The FCC has no jurisdiction over information service like wireless Internet access.

            It gets even better when someone suggests that ripped off subscribers simply will sue in state court.  Here’s the double dutch dose of creativity: we respond that subscribers must comply with mandatory arbitration which is going to cost more than what subscribers individually lost.  Thank you Supreme Court.  And if that somehow does not work we argue that the FCC has preempted the states from asserting jurisdiction, because data access is wire and radio.  If the FCC has opted not to regulate and to impose a duty to deal fairly with subscribers, then states (and for that matter courts hearing antitrust claims) have no basis to upset the FCC’s decision making.

            Is this a great country or what?

           

A Right Way, A Wrong Way and the . . .

Back in my home town of Norfolk, Virginia one quickly learned that the Navy—a dominant presence—had its own rules.  The Navy Way was not right or wrong.  So when I get frustrated or confused I often attribute it to simply not knowing all the applicable rules.

I unintentionally downloaded and launched Microsoft’s Internet 9 web browser and quickly noticed that the list of frequently viewed web sites appear not on the left side, but on the right.  How many weeks will it take me to adjust to the new Rule?

Why the change?  Because Microsoft and its managers can make arbitrary decisions without much concern for user inconvenience. The Microsoft Way tends to create three steps where one or two previously worked.  Of course the Microsoft Way provides users the opportunity to shift favorites to the left side of the screen, but maybe you guessed that they revert to the right the next time you launch Internet Explorer.

The Microsoft Way predominates in the word processing market, much to the chagrin of people like me who found Wordperfect superior.  Today—on deadline or course—Microsoft Word suddenly lost its ability to count and number footnotes.  Yes, some academics face and meet deadlines and no, this glitch was not the product of operator error.  The Microsoft Way apparently does not change numbering until one accepts all changes when using the editing review process.  Of course I did not have that process in operation.  So the footnote editing process took three times as long as it otherwise would.

There’s an FCC Way as well, and it seems to work regardless of which political party controls the Whitehouse.  Top managers at the Commission determine whether people like are “with us, or against us” and whether outsiders have enough juice to make problems.  It comes across as a siege mentality, but cross one of these gatekeepers or fail the significance test and your calls and emails don’t get answered.  Apparently my work on regulatory reform, critiques of FCC decisions, and occasional work with certain out of grace public interest groups make responding to my infrequent calls and emails unnecessary.  Or maybe I am unworthy of a callback in light of my insignificance.  Or maybe I simply lack the gravitas worthy of a response. 

In any event my queries, offers to provide insights, volunteering to join an advisory group and even a free copy of my latest book trigger no response.  This frustrates me and creates every incentive for me to give up and accept my insignificance.  I’d like to think if I ever filled one of their positions I’d do the right thing and return their call.

Mercatus Center Panel on Wireless Competition

The Mercatus Center, based at George Mason University, hosted a panel on the state of wireless competition in the U.S. and how the FCC frames the issue in its annual reports to Congress.  See http://mercatus.org/events/fccs-wireless-competition-report-preview.  Here's a link to my presentation slides:

click on the first link under Recent Conference Presentations: http://www.personal.psu.edu/users/r/m/rmf5/

New Publication: A Nuanced Assessment of Network Neutrality

     The Penn State Law Review, 115 Penn St. L. Rev. 49 (2010), has published my article entitled Assessing the Merits of Network Neutrality Obligations at Low, Medium and High Operating Layers.  It's available at: http://tinyurl.com/3h3xwah.

Here's the abstract:

     The often contentious network neutrality debate typically cleaves along an absolute for, or against dichotomy.  Where one stands on the issue often depends on the degree of confidence in the ability of marketplace forces to promote self-regulation and remedies to acute problems.  Such a macroscopic perspective promotes a large difference of opinion with plenty of opportunities for public disparagement of the opposition.  This orientation largely forecloses a more nuanced analysis that could consider the need for government intervention based on different layers of the network infrastructure used to provide Internet connections.
     Whether the Internet requires some degree of government oversight, dispute resolution and stewardship requires serious consideration rather than sloganeering and dueling advocacy web pages.  An essential element for such analysis breaks down the Internet into at least three layers having different characteristics that can affect the arguments for, or against the enforcement of network neutrality rules.  The physical layer provides the infrastructure needed to establish a basic communications link between two or more parties.  Ridding on top of this basic bitstream transmission conduit are communications protocols and standards like the Transmission Control Protocol that manage the routers that select networks to carry traffic and the Internet Protocol that establishes a globally used addressing system.  Farther atop the physical layer and the layers that set up and process transmissions are the content, applications and software that provide various end-user services,
     This paper will consider the network neutrality debate in the context of these three different layered components of the Internet.  The paper will show that compelling arguments for enforceable network neutrality rules are strongest at the low layer, contestible at the middle layer and unnecessary at the high layer.  Such a layer-based view of network neutrality explains that the need for government involvement depends on which part of the Internet’s networking infrastructure one examines.  The need for government safeguards varies by layer, because the current and future degree of robust competition and effective self-regulation varies.
     For one comfortable with government involvement and network neutrality rules, the paper will challenge the need for such oversight in the competitive marketplace for Internet-mediated content, applications and software.  For others uncomfortable with any government involvement, the paper will identify instances where market failure, or the lack of actual or sustainable competition necessitate government oversight to ensure fair dealing by a limited number of operators providing Internet access.  In the middle layers, where Internet Service Providers use protocols and technologies to manage their networks, but possibly also to favor corporate affiliates and certain third party providers of content, the paper suggests the need for a government referee authorized to resolve disputes and to examine causes of congestion and service interruptions.  
     The paper also considers the problems in having a single set of network neutrality requirements that fail to apply different public interest safeguards for vertically integrated ventures that operate in all three operating layers.  The paper recommends layer-specific network neutrality analysis and rulemaking.

Compulsory Data Roaming: The FCC Imposes a Duty to Deal

     The FCC’s recent Second Report and Order on data roaming obligations of facilities-based wireless carriers (see http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-52A1.doc) requires interconnection backed up with the power to resolve formal complaints if commercially driven negotiations fail.  The two Republican Commissioners dissented from the order based on the view that the FCC lacks jurisdiction to compel information service providers to interconnect.  The Democratic majority relies primarily on the view that Title III confers broad regulatory power over any venture using licensed spectrum, not just radio and television broadcasters.

     This order shows the FCC at its creative best.  The authors of the order manage to replace the failed Title I, ancillary jurisdiction rationale with an expansive interpretation of Title III, while avoiding the inconvenient fact that the Commission treats wireless broadband and data services as information services not subject to Title II oversight.  In this order the Commission creates a non common carrier duty to deal, i.e., wireless carriers must interconnect their data networks and provide access to roaming data service subscribers who take service from another unaffiliated carrier.

     Only AT&T and Verizon opposed the FCC’s efforts to remedy a market failure resulting from insufficient competitive necessity for the two major carriers voluntarily to offer reciprocal data roaming agreements.   The FCC correctly identified a problem that could prevent consumers from relying on their smartphones as mobile computers, but the Commission’s rationale may not pass muster with a reviewing court. 

     The FCC appears to impose a duty to deal on carriers based primarily on their use of spectrum and the Commission’s broad mandate to service the public interest.  By concentrating on Title III and the broad mandate in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to promote Internet access, the Commission hopes it can impose a conventional common carrier interconnection obligation even in the absence of explicit statutory authority.  Because Title II cannot apply directly to data roaming, the FCC frames the interconnection obligation as a “spectrum usage condition” (¶66) and not a common carrier obligation.  The Commission presumes that this characterization makes it possible to maneuver around the limitation contained in Section 332 that limits the application of streamlined Title II common carrier obligations only to voice services that connect with conventional wireline telephone networks.   The Commission summarily states that it does not have to make the determination whether and how Sec. 332 applies, if more broadly all or other sections within Title III applies.

     The FCC attempts to differentiate compulsory data roaming interconnection from common carriage, by emphasizing that wireless carriers will not apply single, tariffed terms and conditions.  So in the Commission’s creative interpretation, a common carrier obligation does not exist when a carrier is compelled to negotiate on an individualized, carrier-specific manner. But surely the Commission has created a duty to deal and common carriage means only that a carrier must offer nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to one or more “similarly situated” users.  In other words the common carrier duty to provide service to all people “indifferently” can result in a tariff or contract serving just one user or carrier, because no other user or carrier has similar usage requirements.  For example, the fact that the United States government might have specific and large requirements unmatched by other users does not by itself convert service from Title II regulated common carriage to private carriage.

     The FCC’s dilemma results from the misguided decision to apply the deregulated “safe harbor” information service classification to any and all types of wired and wireless Internet access.  It seemed good at the time: a hands off the Internet commitment.  The Commisison had to construct creative distinctions between offering and providing telecommunications and between a standalone and identifiable telecommunications service and a telecommunications that becomes so integrated into an information service as to be inseparable.  Of course wireless carriers use telecommunications to link subscribers’ smartphones to a wireless data network via telecommunications.  But in the FCC’s mindset, a venture can qualify for complete deregulation if the Commission can identify an information service.  That’s how the FCC made it possible to reclassify Digital Subscriber Line service as non common carriage and that’s also how the Commission made it possible to convert wireless telephone companies into information service providers.

     Had the Commission shown some restraint in its zeal to deregulate it would not have to erect clever and largely unsustainable statutory interpretations to resurrect limited, but essential consumer safeguards.

News Flash!—FCC Identifies Market Failures in Wireless Marketplace

     The FCC’s recent Second Report and Order on data roaming obligations of facilities-based operators (see http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-52A1.doc) offers two fascinating insights, only one of which will receive much attention.  Scholars and practitioners alike will concentrate on the FCC’s use of Title III spectrum management as the basis for mandating data roaming negotiations, backed up by formal complaint resolution.  Analysts will marvel at how the Commission has managed to impose an interconnection regime without convincingly addressing how information service providers lawfully bear such duties.  Additionally the Commission  does not fully explain how the duty to negotiate on commercially reasonable terms and conditions does not constitute common carriage and a “duty to deal.”   

     In a future blog I will address these issues, but now will consider another matter unlikely to get coverage.  This document is very, very important, because the FCC clearly identifies instances where the nature and type of wireless competition is inadequate to guarantee data roaming agreements between the major national carriers, such as AT&T and Verizon, and just about any other carrier.   Only AT&T and Verizon opposed a data roaming obligation,  because, as noted by the Commission, these carriers have refused to deal (¶24) and market consolidation “has reduced the number of potential roaming partners for some of the smaller, regional and rural providers” while also reducing the need for AT&T and Verizon to secure reciprocal roaming agreements (¶27).
     Such candor coming from an agency that never saw a wireless merger it could not approve and has never disputed industry claims how tirelessly they have to compete.  So if the wireless marketplace is so vigorously competitive would it not stand to reason that AT&T and Verizon would have to offer nationwide data roaming so that their data coverage maps show ubiquitous access?   If this market operated competitively would not AT&T and Verizon conclude that they should offer smaller carriers reciprocal access, even if doing so offers greater opportunities for little carriers to offer a competitive national data access service.

     It appears that the FCC acknowledges a market failure existing for a category of service that will become increasingly important.  If as advertized smartphones have become the functional equivalent of a wireless computer, then carriers have to offer near ubiquitous broadband access.  A deliberate strategy of denying interconnection by AT&T and Verizon, which the FCC identifies as occurring, constitutes an intentional tactic to exploit their market power and to further differentiate their services as superior. 
     We can dispute whether these two carriers have a compulsory duty to deal—as common carriers, or licensed spectrum users-- but one fact is indisputable: the need for the FCC to compel interconnection means that no market-driven incentive exists for AT&T and Verizon to offer interconnection reciprocity.  The FCC had to intervene, because the so-called competitive wireless marketplace would not prevent two dominant carriers from exploiting their dominance to achieve anticompetitive goals.

Panadora Investigation

Marketplace Morning offers a few secs. of my thoughts on Pandora mobile apps investigation: http://lb.vg/BX67C.

Nice to receive a call at 6:45 am not involving a calamity.

Explaining Wireless Spectrum Woes

     Yet again The Wall Street Journal, in an editorial and op-ed piece, uses snarkiness and mischaracterizations to refute legitimate concerns about AT&T’s acquisition of T-Mobile.  See Wall Street Journal, Review & Outlook, More Spectrum, Please--AT&T bids $39 billion to get around FCC bottlenecks, A14  (March 23, 2011); Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. AT&T’s Big Bet on Spectrum Folly, A13 (March 23, 2011).  These pieces reframe the issue from a question about market concentration into an endorsement of AT&T’s valiant “self-help” efforts to find adequate spectrum for consumers.  They glibly ignore or dismiss the proper focus on how the deal would affect consumers, competition, innovation, employment and service prices. 

     The Journal dismisses as hackneyed Gigi Sohn’s conclusion that allowing two or three ventures to control over 92% of the market reduces competition and choice, raises prices, reduces innovation and results in fewer jobs. See PBS News Hour, How Will Consumers Fare in T-Mobile, AT&T Merger? (March 22, 2011); available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june11/wireless_03-22.html

     Once upon a time even the Republican Party of Teddy Roosevelt acted to prevent marketplace distortion caused by monopoly “trusts.” When a market lacks robust competition few operators do not have to spend sleepless afternoons innovating and striving to operate more efficiently.  Wireless carriers in the U.S. generate some of the world’s higher Average Revenue Per User.  These carriers do this by offering users large baskets of minutes to use making it possible to operate with vast profits and for the Journal to tout how consumers enjoy some of the lowest rates.  One can chisel down the per minute cost of service and the per text rate with high volume usage.  But such usage triggers spectrum and other infrastructure problems for which the carriers and the Journal blame the FCC.

     The truth is far more complex than simply demeaning the FCC and claiming this agency “micromanages” the marketplace.  Spectrum scarcity exists largely because other agencies of the U.S. government—primarily the defense, intelligence and homeland security agencies—hoard over 50 percent.  The second most important factor results from who makes spectrum decisions and how they do it.  Because spectrum crosses national borders, nations have to share and coordinate use.  The International Telecommunication Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations, allocates blocks of spectrum and specifies what uses are appropriate.  National regulatory authorities, like the FCC, in turn allocate spectrum largely consistent with the ITU-forged consensus. 

     Spectrum management decisions can rely on outdated assumptions about the ability of users not to interfere with each other.  For example, the ITU still has spectrum allocations that specify primary uses exclusively for land, sea or airborne use.  Technological innovations now make it possible to use a handheld device in all three locations.  But for the time being all involved government agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense and State, accept the consensus even as they try to persuade nations to accept more flexible spectrum use.

     Spectrum scarcity is a real and constraining factor for wireless carriers.  But AT&T and its cheerleaders, simply use this factor, to prevent the close scrutiny needed to ensure robust competition.

The Likely AT&T Wireless Playbook for Securing Authority to Acquire T-Mobile

     There are several tried and true tactics that AT&T Wireless can use to convince the FCC and Department of Justice to approve the company’s merger with T-Mobile notwithstanding the obvious harmful and anticompetitive consequences.  Regardless of which party controls the White House these tactics work as evidenced by the rare instance where a market concentrating telecommunications mega-merger is not approved.  AT&T will reframe the merger away from market concentration and into the realm of better serving the consumer and responding to delays in FCC regulatory reform.

1)         This merger will benefit consumers! 

            Let me get this straight: a horizontal merger buying out one of 4 major players, which control over 90% of the wireless marketplace, is good for me?  Would a merger of the 2d and 4^th airlines in the U.S. (Delta Airlines and American Airlines) benefit the consumer with lower rates, more choices, better rural options, etc.?  AT&T’s acquisition of T-Mobile’s market share and spectrum will make AT&T a better service provider.  Perhaps, but at what harm to the traditional benefits in a robustly competitive market?  Might an oligopolistic wireless market have carriers implicitly agreeing not to compete on price?  It looks like that already occurs: is it market equilibrium, or price fixing for the 4 major carriers already to offer the same price points for the same number of minutes?  Why won’t a carrier offer discounted service rates to subscribers who do not want a new subsidized handset? 

            Market consolidation typically harms consumers with fewer choices, less competitive necessity to lower prices and greater carrier inflexibility.  Yes carriers need scale and ever more spectrum, but a merger is more about buying out competition than becoming a more effective and efficient competitor.  With fewer carriers it becomes easier for the survivors—collectively, collusively or independently—to reach the same conclusions about network neutrality, service tiering and disabling features available from subscribers’ handsets.  Once AT&T fires the thousands of redundant T-Mobile employees, it can claim how precompetitive FCC regulation “kills jobs.”  Just when the FCC has to show a backbone on matters of consumer protection, the remaining 2 or 3 national wireless carriers will have the clout to persuade fringe and mainstream political factions how carriers can self-regulate.

2)         The FCC made us do it! 

            This tactic shows that the best defense is an outrageous offense.  AT&T frames the need to buyout a competitor as the product of FCC regulatory decisions that deprived the company of enough spectrum to satisfy consumer demand.  So AT&T’s well deserved record of poor service is the FCC’s fault and not the product of selling too many subscriptions and failing to match switching and other infrastructure elements with the onslaught of Iphone subscribers.

            AT&T like wireless subscribers could use more spectrum, but the FCC has accommodated incumbent carriers from the onset of cellular service to present.  AT&T’s local carriers got free spectrum and a first mover advantage when the FCC “set aside” spectrum for wireline incumbent and required newcomers to compete in a comparative hearing.  The FCC abandoned a cap on spectrum controlled by any single carrier and will not designate any new spectrum for market entrants instead of incumbents.

            AT&T does not want the FCC or us to remember that the company first disabled the Wi-Fi features in its handsets, thereby preventing use of additional spectrum that might have made the AT&T network less congested.  AT&T later permitted conditional Wi-Fi use even as the company wanted subscribers to buy a femtocell device that would offload some of its traffic onto the Internet services of other carriers.  AT&T and Verizon recently acquired the lion’s share of newly available spectrum and with fewer competitors bidding for future spectrum the federal government will generate less from spectrum auctions.  Of course with less competition, AT&T might not have to pass through its savings with lower rates for service.  On the contrary AT&T and the surviving wireless carriers soon will abandon unmetered service plans.  Even as the company hypes smartphones as handheld computers, wireless carriers will make metered data services a profit center able to raise average revenue per subscriber (“ARPU”) already at levels few carriers in other nations come close to generating.

3)         Prominent scholars and consultants endorse the merger!

            I could have self-financed my kids’ college educations if only I had joined the ranks of “scholars for dollars.”  An impressive array of academics will write white papers, scholarly law review articles, affidavits, expert statements and other products endorsing the merger. Few will acknowledge their financial sponsor and all will claim that they came up with the ideas in the paper independently of their sponsor’s regulatory agenda.

            The murky world of rarely disclosed sponsored research will provide fire power to AT&T’s arguments how the merger makes operational and economic sense without harming the national interest, or the subscribers of AT&T and T-Mobile.  Sponsored researchers will make outlandish assertions that would not pass muster under rigorous peer review.  Nevertheless these sorts of documents will find a home in filings at the FCC and in prominent law and economic journals.  Rarely do these journals even require notification about AT&T’s sponsorship, or that of countless other Washington think tanks funded by AT&T.

4)         Our merger will achieve the same type benefits as other mega-mergers.         

    
        The FCC rarely receives a merger application it cannot conditionally approve.  AT&T surely will have to share the wealth to make the merger happen, but a company that come up with $25 billion in cash to acquire T-Mobile, surely can spend an extra few hundred million dollars to persuade Congress that the merger will serve the national interest.  I mention Congress, because the FCC and DOJ surely do not want to make the legislature unhappy, especially the individuals who chair oversight and funding hearings.

      Of course AT&T will come up with a bunch of “voluntary concessions” that will secure votes from ambivalent Commissioners.  These concessions typically add a minor cost to the acquisition and sound wonderful.  But AT&T in particular has a skill in offering something that is both limited in time and actual benefit.  We can expect to see AT&T offering all sorts of rural buildout commitments, as well as support for open and neutral access to its network.  The commitment will have conditions and exceptions that mitigate the benefit.  For example, when AT&T acquired BellSouth the FCC received a voluntary network neutrality commitment, but one limited to a few years and applicable only the DSL service line linking retail subscribers and the first AT&T switching facility.  

            A year or so from now AT&T probably will get conditional merger authority.  The future dominant means for accessing the Internet will become an unregulated conduit controlled by companies free to leverage employment and infrastructure buildouts for a free reign.

AT&T-T Mobile One Merger Too Many?

So AT&T wants to acquire T-Mobile's market share concentrating the wireless marketplace so that 3 carriers control over 90% of the market.  Would anyone buy the bogus argument that No. 2 Delta Airline's acqusition of No. 4 American would "promote competition"?  Does anyone notice that mergers are job killing?  Does the FCC and the Justice Department have the courage to say no? 

Bear in mind the FCC rarely refuses to approve with conditions market concentrating mergers.  For wireless the FCC has abandoned spectrum caps and making new spectrum available only to new market bidders.

I predict that months from now the FCC will find a way to frame this merger as something really great for consumers.  Bogus!

New Publication--Legislative and Regulatory Strategies for Providing Consumer Safeguards in a Convergent Information and Communications Marketplace

The Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, has published my article entitled Legislative and Regulatory Strategies for Providing Consumer Safeguards in a Convergent Information and Communications Marketplace. Here's the abstract:   

Many ventures involved in information, communications and entertainment (“ICE”) industries have begun to expand their array of offered services.  Technological convergence, digitization and the ability of the Internet to handle many different service types within a single bitstream make it possible for companies to offer “quadruple play” bundles of wireless and wireline telephony, video, and Internet access services.  Financial and efficiency gains from vertical integration, and the search for new revenues to replace declining margins from maturing and newly competitive services, combine to create robust incentives for carriers to diversify.

Diversification by ventures typically results in a single company providing services that fit within more than one regulatory classification.  This frustrates the FCC’s desire to apply a single regulatory classification to services and service providers, a process the Commission could achieve when ventures concentrated on one function, e.g., operating a conduit for content created by others, and offered one readily identifiable service, e.g., telephony.  Diversification also obscures the specific reach of the FCC’s regulatory wingspan, both in terms of what regulatory classification applies to which services and what regulatory safeguards the Commission can lawfully apply.  For example, an appellate court recently reversed the FCC’s attempt to subject Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to regulatory safeguards identified in Title II of the Communications Act, as amended, but which the Commission wanted to apply using the concept of “ancillary jurisdiction” based on Title I of the Act.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the FCC’s attempt to apply such safeguards on ventures classified as information service providers, a status that qualifies for a largely unregulated “safe harbor.”

In light of an appellate court reversal, the FCC must rethink how it can serve the public interest and safeguard consumers, despite having broadly applied the information service classification to all Internet services and ISPs.  Already the FCC has had to find ways to impose Title II-type regulatory safeguards on providers of Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”)  service.  Additionally the Commission has avoided making necessary regulatory classifications as to which category new services such as VoIP and Internet Protocol Television fit.  

Absent a legislative remedy the FCC must find a way that will pass muster with reviewing court, but also provide necessary safeguards.  FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski has proposed to reclassify Internet access as Title II regulated service subject to extensive forbearance from applying many regulatory safeguards he considers unnecessary.  Such a re-classification, coming on the heels of court reversal, appears as after the fact scrambling to re-arrange the wingspan of Title II jurisdiction without statutory authority.

This paper will explain how the FCC has backed itself into a corner in light of its predisposition to apply the information service classification indiscriminately and its perceived duty to make either/or determinations about services, i.e., to apply either the telecommunications service classification singularly, or the information service singularly to a convergent service that combines both elements.  The paper also will provide recommendations on how the Commission might recognize that convergent services, such as Internet access, combine both components in much the same way as wireless cellular telephone companies offer both regulated common carrier telecommunications services, subject to forbearance, and unregulated information services via the same conduit.  The paper recommends that in light of the ascending importance of Internet access and the lack of sustainable competition that would favor self-regulation, Congress should amend the Communications Act to authorize the FCC to apply limited elements of Title II safeguards as already exists for wireless telephony.  In light of the failure of Congress to reach consensus, the paper suggests that the FCC safeguard consumers when information service providers cause harm as the Commission did when a DSL service provider blocked access to competing VoIP services.

     

Lies, Damn Lies and Broadband Statistics

The FCC and NTIA have launched a broadband map that purports to give quite granular and current data about broadband accessibility.  Don't count on realistic statistics.  See Broadband Map

The casual reader won't catch the use of advertised, maximum speeds.  When, if ever, will the FCC and NTIA start to plug in real, measured speeds? 

The casual reader also may not quibble about the reported, advertised speeds.  When the site reports 50-100 megabits per second, as it does for my location, would not a reader infer a speed somewhere probably midway between the two poles?  Comcast offers a $99.99 plus, plus Extreme 50 Plan for downlink speeds "up to" 50 megabits per second.  So why not bump that platinum plan up to the NEXT rate band?  And let's forget about how many people actually subscribe to this level of service, if really available.

At first glance, the FCC and NTIA, are overstating reality.  This reminds me that there are lies, damn lies and broadband statistics.

New, Old and Forgotten Frames in the Network Neutrality Debate

            One key reason for confusion about Network Neutrality lies in the many different and inconsistent frames used to shape the debate.  The Tea Party has entered the fray by characterizing the matter primarily in terms of freedom.  Republicans decry the “job killing” impact of the FCC’s rules.  Network Neutrality advocates appear ambivalent whether the FCC has capitulated to special interests, or shaped a pragmatic compromise.

            Older frames typically use hyperbole to justify government intervention or forbearance.  Network Neutrality advocates frame the matter as impacting the Internet’s openness and its ability to incubate new ventures such as Google, Netflix, Amazon and EBay.  Opponents reject the need for government safeguards based on the view that there is no problem requiring a solution.

            Everyone seems to have ignored a more basic question whether or not the Internet access market currently operates competitively.  If the market is sufficiently competitive one can vote with their dollars and change carriers if and when the carrier operates in ways subscribers do not like.  Of course there are transaction costs in making such a move, and in the wireless market carriers offer subsidized handsets to lock in subscribers for two years.  As well the matter of identifying the cause of network congestion, sluggish service or discriminatory practices presents a forensic problem.  In light of the interconnected and integrated nature of the Internet, where content and conduit converge, an end user cannot readily determine if degradation in service—however defined—is caused by the content or application provider, a long haul carrier, or the ISP providing first and last mile access to the Internet cloud.

            Still if the Internet access marketplace operates competitively, then consumers, if so inclined, can reward or punish ISPs based on the real or perceived openness.  Even in competitive markets, carriers can agree explicitly or decide unilaterally not to emphasize or market different degrees of openness.  But at least the potential exists for an ISP to identify the openness factor and target consumers who consider it a priority.  This is not happening in the Internet access marketplace either because openness, transparency and nondiscrimination are non-issues, because all ISPs are fair and neutral, or because consumers do not have the ability to identify and subscriber to an ISP promising fair and neutral service should the existing carrier explicitly or subversively operate in a non-neutral manner.

            So competition in the Internet access marketplace matters greatly and somehow this issue constitutes a “huge omission” in the debate according to the fair minded writers at The Economist.  See A tangled web, America’s new internet rules are mostly sensible—but the country’s real web problem is far more basic (Dec. 29, 2010); available at: http://www.economist.com/node/17800141.  If I had access to a competitive marketplace ISPs would have offer me something better than the one (and only one viable) option I have now:  $59.95 plus tax and fees for downloads up to 15Mbps, and  uploads up to 3Mbps, or $40.95 plus tax and fees for up to 1.5 Mbps download and uploads up to 384 Kbps.

            Just because many consumers have a choice of two broadband distribution platforms (cable and DSL) does not by definition ensure robust competition with affordable rates. The Economist dares to report the issue frame ignored by the FCC and others:

the failure in America to tackle the underlying lack of competition in the provision of internet access. In other rich countries it would not matter if some operators blocked some sites: consumers could switch to a rival provider. That is because the big telecoms firms with wires into people’s homes have to offer access to their networks on a wholesale basis, ensuring vigorous competition between dozens of providers, with lower   prices and faster connections than are available in America. Getting America’s phone and cable companies to open up their networks to others would be a lot harder for politicians than prattling on about neutrality; but it would do far more to open up the net.

Summary of FCC's Net Neutrality Report and Order

In a split decision, likely to face congressional and judicial review, the FCC issued rules designed to promote transparent, unblocked and nondiscriminatory Internet access. [1]  Ostensibly structured to offer an acceptable compromise the Report and Order imposes basic network neutrality obligations on Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) [2] with exceptions made for reasonable network management, [3] specialized services [4] and wireless access. [5]  The FCC reiterated that to ensure open Internet the Commission must establish clear and certain rules applicable to both fixed. i.e., wire-based and mobile, i.e., wireless, ISPs.

 The transparency requirement obligates all ISPs to disclose their network management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services. [6]

The FCC adopted different requirements for fixed and broadband providers on the other two key requirements.  Fixed providers may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices while mobile broadband providers may not block lawful websites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services. [7] On the other key requirement fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic while mobile carriers face a general no blocking rule that guarantees end users’ access to the web and protects against mobile broadband providers’ blocking applications that compete with their other primary service offering—voice and video telephony. [8] 

            The Report and Order rejects assertions that network neutrality requirements would stifle innovation reduce incentives to invest in network infrastructure and reduce employment in the Internet economy:

We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of reasonable network management, will empower and protect consumers and innovators while helping ensure that the Internet continues to flourish, with robust private investment and rapid innovation at both the core and the edge of the network.  This is consistent with the National Broadband Plan goal of broadband access that is ubiquitous and fast, promoting the global competitiveness of the United States. [9]

In light of strident dissents from the two Republican Commissioners, the Report and Order appears to emphasize that the final rules logically follow from the nonpartisan consensus reached in documents created in 2005 and 2007, [10] and do not violate the Constitution,[11] particularly First Amendment expression rights of ISPs and the prohibition on government takings in the Fifth Amendment. 

Additionally the Report and Order extensively attempts to demonstrate that the FCC has lawful jurisdiction to promulgate network neutrality rules, primarily because Congress, in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, authorized the Commission to take all reasonable steps to promote widespread access to the Internet. [12] In light of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversal of the FCC’s sanctioning Comcast for violating Network Neutrality principles, the Commission must establish clear and direct statutory authority to impose new rules.  The Commission heavily relies on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act which does not explicitly authorize regulation and rule making.  The FCC infers that the duty to encourage the deployment of “advanced telecommunications capability” authorizes the Commission to use whatever tools it considers necessary to achieve timely progress. [13] 

The assumption of statutory authority requires two novel reinterpretations of the definition for telecommunications contained in the Communications Act, as amended.  First, the FCC has to consider advanced telecommunications capability to include Internet access, [14] despite having previously concluded that the technologies providing such access constitute an  insignificant factor when the Commission determined that cable modem service constituted an information service and not a telecommunications service. [15]  Second, the FCC now has to elevate the significance of the telecommunications bit transmission function in Internet access [16] to trigger public interest concerns about competition and anticompetitive practices having previously subordinated it so that the Commission could provide an unregulated “safe harbor” for all Internet access technologies including cable modem service, [17] Digital Subscriber          Lines, [18] Broadband over Power Lines [19] and wireless services. [20] Now the FCC wants to validate the telecommunications component as the driver for public interest regulatory safeguards.

Despite having previously concluded that the broadband marketplace was robustly competitive and close to ubiquitous, the Commission now cites to more recent market penetration data to support its involvement:

Section 706(b) of the 1996 Act provides additional authority to take actions such as enforcing open Internet principles.  It directs the Commission to undertake annual inquiries concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans and requires that, if the Commission finds that such capability is not being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion, it “shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.”  In July 2010, the Commission “conclude[d] that broadband deployment to all Americans is not reasonable and timely” and noted that “[a]s a consequence of that conclusion,” Section 706(b) was triggered.  Section 706(b) therefore provides express authority for the pro-investment, pro-competition rules we adopt today. [21]

Additionally the FCC invokes elements of Title II, III and Title VI regulatory authority to ISPs that qualify for the largely unregulated statutory classification of information service providers and not telecommunications service providers for which Title II customarily applies. Instead of stating that ISPs operate as telecommunications service providers when they provide essential first and last mile access to the Internet—a scenario suggested by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski and now apparently rejected—the Report and Order states that because some Internet-based services compete with traditional telephone, broadcast and video services, the Commission has jurisdiction to impose rules and regulations to prevent anticompetitive practices and to promote competition.

The FCC justifies imposing Network Neutrality rules on ISPs based on the Commission’s conclusion that ISPs have the incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive practices that limit Internet openness in terms of content, applications, services, and devices accessed over or connected to broadband Internet access service. The Commission provides three examples suggesting that ISPs may have incentives to block or degrade content that competes with that offered by the ISP or an affiliate, to impose surcharges on competing content providers in addition to end user subscription fees, and to degrade competitors’ traffic:

1)         “[B]roadband providers may have economic incentives to block or otherwise disadvantage specific edge providers or classes of edge providers, for example by controlling the transmission of network traffic over a broadband connection, including the price and quality of access to end users.  A broadband provider might use this power to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the expense of unaffiliated offerings.” [22]

2)         “[B]roadband providers may have incentives to increase revenues by charging edge providers, who already pay for their own connections to the Internet, for access or prioritized access to end users.  Although broadband providers have not historically imposed such fees, they have argued they should be permitted to do so. A broadband provider could force edge providers to pay inefficiently high fees because that broadband provider is typically an edge provider’s only option for reaching a particular end user. Thus broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers.” [23]

3)         “[I]f broadband providers can profitably charge edge providers for prioritized access to end users, they will have an incentive to degrade or decline to increase the quality of the service they provide to non-prioritized traffic.  This would increase the gap in quality (such as latency in transmission) between prioritized access and non-prioritized access, induce more edge providers to pay for prioritized access, and allow broadband providers to charge higher prices for prioritized access.  Even more damaging, broadband providers might withhold or decline to expand capacity in order to “squeeze” non-prioritized traffic, a strategy that would increase the likelihood of network congestion and confront edge providers with a choice between accepting low-quality transmission or paying fees for prioritized access to end users. [24]

            The FCC considers the three examples of discrimination as more than theoretical in light of actual examples where ISPs, such as Comcast, blocked or degraded traffic without legitimate network management concerns.  Similarly the Commission states that the benefits in guarding against such anticompetitive practices outweighs the costs. [25]

           

---

[1]           Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, Report and Order, FCC 10-201 (rel. Dec. 23, 2010); available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.doc [hereinafter cited as Network Neutrality Order].

[2]           Specifically the FCC imposes rules on the providers of broadband Internet access service, defined as a“mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service.  This term also encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in this Part.” Id. at ¶44.

[3]           “A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service.” Id. at ¶82.

[4]           “‘[S]pecialized services,’ such as some broadband providers’ existing facilities-based VoIP and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ from broadband Internet access service . . ..” Id. at ¶112. “We will closely monitor the robustness and affordability of broadband Internet access services, with a particular focus on any signs that specialized services are in any way retarding the growth of or constricting capacity available for broadband Internet access service.  We fully expect that broadband providers will increase capacity offered for broadband Internet access service if they expand network capacity to accommodate specialized services.  We would be concerned if capacity for broadband Internet access service did not keep pace.  We also expect broadband providers to disclose information about specialized services’ impact, if any, on last-mile capacity available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access service.  We may consider additional disclosure requirements in this area in our related proceeding regarding consumer transparency and disclosure.” Id. at ¶114.

[5]           Despite the likelihood that wireless network access will grow and perhaps become the primary way people access the Internet, the FCC established relaxed anti-blocking rules based on spectrum and operational limitations not applicable to wire-based networks. “A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites, subject to reasonable network management; nor shall such person block applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable network management.” Id. at ¶99.

[6]           Id. at ¶1.  “A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.” Id. at ¶54.

[7]           “A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.” Id. at ¶63.

[8]           Id. at ¶99.

[9]           Id. at ¶1.

[10]          “The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt today follow directly from the Commission’s bipartisan Internet Policy Statement, adopted unanimously in 2005 and made temporarily enforceable for certain broadband providers in 2005 and 2007; openness protections the Commission established in 2007 for users of certain wireless spectrum; and a notice of inquiry in 2007 that asked, among other things, whether the Commission should add a principle of nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement.  Our rules build upon these actions, first and foremost by requiring broadband providers to be transparent in their network management practices, so that end users can make informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and maintain Internet-based offerings.  The rules also prevent certain forms of blocking and discrimination with respect to content, applications, services, and devices that depend on or connect to the Internet.” Id. at ¶5(citations omitted).

[11]          See Id. at ¶¶138-150.

[12]          See Id. at ¶¶115-137.

[13]          “As noted, Section 706 of the 1996 Act directs the Commission (along with state commissions) to take actions that encourage the deployment of ‘advanced telecommunications capability.’  . . . Under Section 706(a), the Commission must encourage the deployment of such capability by ‘utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,’ various tools including “measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.” Id. at ¶117.

[14]          “‘[A]dvanced telecommunications capability,’” as defined in the statute, includes broadband Internet access.” Id. at ¶¶117, citing 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (defining “advanced telecommunications capability” as “high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology”); National Broadband Plan for our Future, Notice of Inquiry, 24 FCC Rcd 4342, 4309, App. para. 13 (2009) (“advanced telecommunications capability” includes broadband Internet access); Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 14 FCC Rcd 2398, 2400, para. 1 (Section 706 addresses “the deployment of broadband capability”), 2406 para. 20 (same). 

[15]          See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–78 (2005).

[16]          Note that before the FCC deregulated Internet access, the Commission considered it possible to separate the telecommunications component: “We conclude that advanced services are telecommunications services. The Commission has repeatedly held that specific packet-switched services are ‘basic services,’ that is to say, pure transmission services. xDSL and packet switching are simply transmission technologies. . . . An enduser may utilize a telecommunications service together with an information service, as in the case of Internet access. In such a case, however, we treat the two services separately: the first service is a telecommunications service (e.g., the xDSL-enabled transmission path), and the second service is an information service, in this case Internet access.” Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 13 FCC Rcd. 24012, 24029-30 (1998).

[17]          Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002), affirmed sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–78 (2005).

[18]          Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities,

Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005) petition for

review denied by Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007).

[19]          United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband Over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 13281 (2006).

[20]          Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless

Networks, WT Docket No. 07-53, Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901(2007).

[21]          Id. at ¶123.

[22]          Id. at ¶21.

[23]          Id. at ¶24.

[24]          Id. at ¶29.

[25]          “By comparison to the benefits of these prophylactic measures, the costs associated with the open Internet rules adopted here are likely small. Broadband providers generally endorse openness norms—including the transparency and no blocking principles—as beneficial and in line with current and planned business practices (though they do not uniformly support rules making them enforceable) Even to the extent rules require some additional disclosure of broadband providers’ practices, the costs of compliance should be modest.” Id. at ¶39.