The National Security Trump Card in Spectrum and Wind Farm Policy

          National security concerns often provide a “first among equals” status for government agencies having both justifiable and questionable radio spectrum exclusivity demands.  In some choice frequency bands, U.S. federal government users control over 50%.  See, e.g., Westling, J. (2024). 2024 State of Spectrum. American Action Forum; https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/2024-state-of-spectrum/.

           Even existing government spectrum users will make do with less bandwidth and even share frequency bands when the FCC creates sufficient financial incentives, such as providing ample funds for incumbents to “refarm” spectrum with more efficient equipment using software and other techniques.

           Suddenly out of nowhere, national security concerns apparently warrant abrogation of 5 ocean leases for wind farms, with an immediate cessation of operations or construction. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-pausing-five-offshore-wind-projects-over-national-security-concerns-burgum-2025-12-22/.  Apparently, there is no compromise and mutual accommodation possible like that brokered between public and private spectrum users.  Despite a growing gap between available electricity supply and demand, even operational wind farms on the east coast must shut down immediately.

           Currently, the national security justification has not been extensively articulated.  Apparently, there are concerns that wind warms might interfere with the functionality of radars used in aviation and other essential functions.  Hmm.  Has any expert considered the possibility of routing around the wind farms?  For example, commercial airlines typically use specific routes, known as vectors.  They can deviate from the vector to avoid turbulence and other challenges, and of course, the vectors, as constructs of airspace, can be adjusted.

           I cannot help but notice some factors that may or may not have applicability.  For example, the 5 shut down wind farms are operated in states with a Democratic Party majority.  Danish investors participate in 2 of the farms and their government has balked at ceding control of Greenland to the U.S.  Our President does not like wind power, particularly when located in close proximity to a Scottish golf course he owns.

           Of course there are plausible concerns about wind farms.  But one would think the tendency toward over-regulation and red tape would have considered all possible problems. It takes years for a wind farm proposal to secure all necessary permits.

           Is national security a plausible, and solvable factor in wind farm policy?  The similarly contentious, high-stake radio spectrum market shows compromise is achievable.

Infrastructure Ransomware Targets Are Not Victims

            Companies, like Colonial Pipeline, accrue rich margins for the essential service they provide.  Whether by regulator-granted monopoly franchise, being first to market, or operating in what appears to be a dull, low growth business, infrastructure companies have become complacent.  Having sunk substantial funds in the ground, they rarely perceive the need to make significant, additional investments in such areas as network security. 

             Infrastructure companies owe their customers and the nation a duty of care that includes ongoing efforts to protect their networks from harm, including remote access by criminals and government agents intent on mischief, extortion, espionage, or terrorism.   This duty should be baked into the mindset of infrastructure managers, instead of the conventional wisdom that they can generate higher annual Christmas bonuses, stock prices, and share dividends by scrimping on research, network security enhancements and efforts to protect their investments from now predictable hacking. 

             If someone breaks into your locked car, by smashing a window, the court of public opinion and insurance companies, typically consider you a crime victim, worthy of sympathy and support.  On the other hand, if you kept the car unlocked, or inadvertently left your electronic door opener in the vehicle, compassion and reimbursement evaporate. 

             Colonial Pipeline and other mission critical service providers know that they must keep their networks locked and secured.  Scrimping on these tasks does not pass the smell test, nor does an assertion that infrastructure providers are helpless and have no ability to guard against bad actors who can succeed in hacking networks, often by simply duping employees to click on a credible looking link that triggers a download of malware. 

             As for telecommunications infrastructure, Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Federal Communications Commission recognize both the importance and vulnerability of the broadband networks.  However, they have emphasized the need to blacklist companies and order the removal of equipment by telephone companies, rather than concentrate on comer protection. The FCC relies on mostly anecdotal evidence that Chinese equipment can provide “back door” access for surveillance, espionage, service outages and disruption of equipment supply chains. 

            No one in the federal government appears concerned that private and public harms can result not only based on the nationality of equipment manufacturers, but also from failure of network operators to strengthen network security.  A substantial, long standing body of law, case precedent and commercial best practices imposes a high duty of care by telecommunications carriers and even providers of services whose content rides along the carriers’ transmission conduits. 

             Instead of placing the burden squarely on telecommunications carriers, the FCC appears to think it can solve national security problems by targeting foreign governments.  This strategy offers no protection against sabotage executed via equipment manufactured by domestic companies and friendly, foreign ventures. 

             The FCC has a longstanding, policy of relying on market forces to meet consumer wants, needs, and desires.  Consumers have near complete freedom to attach devices, such as Wi-Fi routers and cable modems, to telecommunications networks.  The only qualifier: the attached device cannot harm the network.   

             What about the potential for the network to cause harm to the user?  Despite blacklisting several Chinese carriers and equipment manufacturers, consumers remain vulnerable to network harm.  Worse yet, the network provider incurs no liability for such harm, and even if its lax attitude toward network security facilitated the harm.  No law currently exists that even imposes the duty to notify subscribers quickly about hacks and stolen consumer data. 

             Apparently bad stuff happens to infrastructure and the provider has no responsibility even to make reasonable efforts to anticipate and minimize harm. 

Buy American: From Cars to Wireless to Apps

            It’s hard for me to equate patriotism with the international trade concept of comparative advantage.  Somehow consumers should abandon the best value and quality proposition in a commercial transaction if the creator lacks U.S. citizenry.  I understand the view that domestic employment matters, but should U.S. consumers bear the possibly severe financial consequences of their government’s efforts to handicap foreign competitors? 

             Is every Walmart customer an economic traitor?

            Years ago, domestic car unions, manufacturers and politicians wanted consumers to think twice about buying foreign made vehicles.  See https://www.npr.org/2017/02/23/516787778/auto-workers-union-to-launch-buy-american-campaign  Now the patriotism litmus test applies to wireless networks, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/technology/fcc-huawei-zte-national-security.html

and new this week, the Tik-Tok social networking app: https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/07/07/business/07reuters-usa-tiktok-china-pompeo.html.

            I cannot understand where to draw the line between legitimate national security and foreign espionage concerns versus thinly veiled market protectionism.  The FCC hasn’t helped with its recent determination that Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturers Huawei and ZTE pose acute national security threats:   https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-designates-huawei-and-zte-national-security-threats.  The FCC relies heavy on conjecture, circumstantial evidence and anecdotes.  That may suffice, but a strategy of handicapping foreign market leaders also constitutes a factor in light of the Commission’s multifaceted campaign to reclaim 5G market “leadership.”  See https://www.fcc.gov/5G.

            I suggest our government officials slow down and consider the consequences of their existing and prospective actions.  A downward spiraling trade war appears possible and rarely does anyone benefit from a “beggar thy neighbor strategy”.  See https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/beggarthyneighbor.asp.

            Similarly, I suggest we take a deep dive on the concept of punishing Chinese government data mining and analytics made possible by U.S. consumer subscriptions to Tik-Tok.  How is this form of governmental surveillance substantially worse than similar tactics of private ventures?  Why do the governments of Russia and other adversaries get a pass if the risk to elections, civil society and trust is arguably equivalent?

            Closing the U.S. market to ventures offering a better mousetrap seems misguided, because it insulates domestic ventures from having to compete robustly and strive to enhance the value proposition of their goods and services.  I don’t support spying by foreign commercial ventures serving as agents for their governments, but I don’t want our nation to further disengage at great expense to its citizens.

Take-Aways From the Yahoo Network-wide Scan

            Yahoo appears to have provided the U.S government with key word scanning of each and every email message traversing the Yahoo network for a limited time period.  See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-nsa-exclusive-idUSKCN1241YT.  There are significant legal and technological issues triggered by this news. 

            On the legal side, it appears that the national intelligence community can and will make a case for email carrier scans of an entire user population when a narrower set of suspects and email accounts cannot be identified.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act imposes no cap on the number of scanned email accounts, nor does it impose a requirement that government agencies first exhaust all internal options before seeking industry cooperation, or compliance with a court order.

            On the technological side, it appears that only Yahoo could have executed the scans on short notice, because Yahoo email subscribers can opt to encrypt their messages.  Having written or at least installed the encryption technology, Yahoo may be the only one able to deencrypt and conduct deep packet inspection of massive traffic volume on a real time basis.

            As to the impact on Verizon’s acquisition of the company, I suspect this news will not have any effect.  It seems like Yahoo had no basis to contest the order (if there was one) in light of the short notice, limited duration and likely assertion by government officials that the company alone could achieve the desired outcome.

            On matters of national security, even at the risk of abuse and overuse, government assertions about the potential for imminent harm trumps individual privacy concerns.