A recent publication in the Federal Communications Law Journal offers the counterintuitive
premise that under conditions where wireless carriers operate under scarce
spectrum conditions, market concentration can offer consumers lower prices than
when more carriers compete. See T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence
J. Spiwak, and Michael
Stern, Wireless Competition Under Spectrum Exhaust, 65 Federeal
Communications Law Journal 80 (Jan. 2013); available at: http://www.phoenix-center.org/FCLJSpectrumExhaust.pdf.
The authors state that they “demonstrate that under a binding spectrum constraint, a
market characterized by few firms (rather than a large number of firms) is more
likely to produce lower prices and possibly increase sector investment and
employment.” That conclusion does not
seem right to me, particularly in light of my personal—call it empirical—experience. When I vote with my dollars under conditions
of resource scarcity, whether caused by government or marketplace conditions, I
have to pay more, not less.
Consider commercial aviation, a
marketplace constrained by airport landing slots, required spacing in the air
and now reduced air traffic controllers thanks to sequestration. Many major airports have allocated all
available landing slots, just as wireless carriers may near spectrum
exhaustion. So what happens in a market
where one or two carriers dominate? The Wall Street Journal, of all sources,
provides an answer that makes sense to me:
Some big-city air routes have
been hit with punishing price increases of 40% and 50%, and other well-traveled
paths likely face big fare hikes in the future. It's the fallout from airline
mergers, and the planned combination of American Airlines and US Airways could
bring a new round of hefty fare increases. When two competitors combine to
dominate prime routes, those markets tend to bear the brunt of higher prices.
(Wall Street Journal, Where Airfares Are
Taking Off (April 10, 2013); available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324010704578414813368268482.html.
I’m sure my friends at the Phoenix
Center could deftly explain why commercial aviation does not provide an
appropriate comparison to wireless carriage. They’d also refute any premise that the financial
sponsors of the Phoenix Center, which may just include certain large wireless
carriers, had anything to do with their motivation to come up with their
premise and find an academic publisher to document it. I’ll have to take them at their word, in part
because I lack the math skills to understand their Cournot model. But—and
this is a big one—I’m not convinced that AT&T and Verizon would lack the
motivation and ability to raise prices should they further bolster their market
dominance.
1 comment:
The article seems based on one released by the writers about a year ago on their web site. I wasn't convinced by the entirety of the arguments, and offered some comments here:
http://gigaom.com/2012/03/25/wireless-competition-turned-upside-down-in-theory/
They, in turn, responded here:
http://phoenix-center.org/blog/archives/535
They made some good points and helpful clarifications, but again I'm not wholly convinced.
That said, there may well be an optimal number of mobile broadband operators in a market. One is probably too few. Ten is probably too many. I'd like the writers to take the next step, adjust the current "arbitrary" inputs to their model, and tell us what they think the optimum number is, and why.
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