The
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have released for public
comment proposed new guidelines designed to address "the many ways mergers
can weaken competition, harming consumers, workers, and businesses." See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/07/ftc-doj-seek-comment-draft-merger-guidelines.
Rather than participate in a thorough debate on the merits of the new
government guidelines, a variety of stakeholders have launched a preemptive
strike to discredit the inquiry and individuals like FTC chairwoman Lina M. Khan.
Sponsored
researchers, Chicago School antitrust doctrine advocates, and maybe some true
believers in the virtues of maintaining the status quo have become apoplectic in
their disapproval, some preemptively oppositional even before release of the proposal.
See e.g., https://www.uschamber.com/finance/antitrust/a-shift-in-merger-enforcement-risks-damaging-our-economy;
https://cei.org/studies/turning-back-the-clock-structural-presumptions-in-merger-analyses-and-revised-merger-guidelines/.
Using a commonsense
standard, I smell a rat. Advocates for
maintaining the status quo have much to lose if DOJ, FTC, and eventually, reviewing
courts, respond to changing marketplace conditions such as the proliferation of
"winner take all" platform intermediaries, like Facebook and
Google. Information Age markets do not
always match the manner in which bricks and mortar markets operate. See Rob Frieden, The Internet of Platforms
and Two-Sided Markets: Implications for Competition and Consumers, 63 Vill.
L. Rev. 269 (2018); https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss2/3/;
Two-Sided Internet Markets and the Need to Assess Both Upstream and
Downstream Impacts, 68 Am. U. L. Rev. 713 (2019); https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2085&context=aulr. Nevertheless,
stakeholders tenaciously adhere to doctrine, rules, laws, and assumptions that surely
need reassessment in light of changed circumstances.
Here are a
few significant new challenges to the status quo.
1) Chicago
School emphasis on consumer welfare and price ignores harmful secondary and tertiary impacts.
It does not
take a Ph. D in economics to see financial and reputational harms resulting from
mergers and acquisitions that further concentrate markets. Even using monetary
impact as the sole evaluative criterion, market dominance makes it possible for
firms to extract monopoly rents. Chicago
School advocates note how firms like Facebook and Goggle and offer a valuable
service "for free." Using
their narrow focus, free represents a remarkable value proposition. However, a
broader focus on economic impact readily identifies offsetting harms: identity
theft, insufficient data protection resulting in stolen email addresses and
passwords, disinformation leading to distrust in government, media, organized
religion, and other bedrock institutions, threats to elections, national
security, and individuals' overall sense of wellbeing, etc.
Free does
not mean without cost, particularly in an ecosystem where "surveillance capitalism"
offers a "free" service as an inducement for the opportunity to mine, collate, market,
and generate revenues from data.
2) Vertical
and horizontal mergers are not necessarily separate transactions.
Conventional
antitrust theory, subsequently baked into case precedent and current DOJ-FTC
merger guidelines, considers as gospel truth the mutual exclusivity of vertical
and horizontal mergers. The former
qualifies for relaxed scrutiny based on the assumption that the acquiring firm did
not compete in the markets served by the acquired firm. The rationale concludes that no harm will
beset consumers in a merger of firms that did not compete with each other in
the first place. Because horizontal
mergers involve the elimination of a competitor and expanded market share for
the acquiring firm, closer scrutiny should apply.
There are
several grave problems with this convenient and simplistic doctrinal
model. Many markets, especially
information, communications, and entertainment ("ICE") ones, have
dominant firms that operate throughout vertical and horizontal "food chains." For example, Comcast creates content (NBC
Universal), syndicates and licenses content for distribution by unaffiliated
firms, and also delivers content to consumers (cable, broadcasting, streaming). The company is vertically integrated and
horizontally integrated. It competes
with companies that also have to pay it for access to "must see"
content, e.g., NBC as a broadcast network still offering mass market
programming such as network news and live sporting events.
If courts did not assume vertical
acquisitions lack any adverse impact on markets and consumers, a vertical
acquisition might get the kind of close scrutiny it warrants. Consider Comcast's acquisition of NBC. The conventional wisdom framed the deal as vertical
integration, because Comcast mostly distributes content as a cable television
operator, with seemingly limited investment in content creation. Even accepting the obvious that Comcast does
create content, reviewing courts assumed the company would never withhold access,
because it would reduce licensing and syndication revenues.
News flash:
Comcast might want to withhold content, or extract higher payments from competitors. So-called retransmission consent requires
Comcast, as the owner of NBC to
negotiate in good faith with unaffiliated cable television companies. Frequently, the parties cannot reach a renewal
agreement on time and valuable content is blocked. These "black outs" have become more
numerous and last longer. See, Rob Frieden, Krishna Jayakar, & Eun-A Park, There’s
Probably a Blackout in Your Television Future: Tracking New Carriage
Negotiation Strategies Between Video Content Programmers and Distributors, 43
Colum. J.L. & Arts 487 (2020); https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-aq85-2z51/download.
3) Mergers
rarely enhance competition.
Has anyone empirically
proven that a merger or acquisition enhances consumer welfare rather than just the
acquiring company's profitability? Does
reducing the number of competitors somehow make the survivors more vigorous competitors,
keen on innovating, reducing prices, improving customer service, and otherwise
making the marketplace more robust?
Consider
TMobile's acquisition of Sprint. The
conventional wisdom, dutifully articulated in the court's approval of the transaction
(see https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2019cv05434/517350/409/)
assumed New TMobile would continue the tradition of being an innovator, lower
cost competitor, and provocative pro-consumer warrior. I see the wireless marketplace as an oligopoly
of three offering roughly the same prices, happy to differentiate
themselves on what "free" content like Netflix they will provide subscribers. Has New TMobile offered
anything innovative and disruptive since acquiring Sprint?
I readily
acknowledge that Sprint had become a failing venture, perhaps on the brink of
bankruptcy. If an incumbent had not
acquired the firm, I believe a new investor gladly would have paid pennies on
the dollar for the opportunity to operate in a market with one of the highest average
revenue per user in the world. Yes,
wireless rates have declined, but they are lower with better terms throughout most
of the world.
4) Platform
intermediaries, operating in two-sided markets, can adversely impact horizontal, vertical, secondary, and
tertiary markets.
Chicago
School antirust doctrine provides simplistic, but easily understood and implemented
rules. Judges and their law clerks, have become indoctrinated in "rules"
that started as theory, but over time got baked into the jurisprudence. I believe the Chicago School doctrine became
unimpeachable gospel largely because stakeholders that would benefit from
relaxed antitrust enforcement, invested heavily in making it a fundamental part
of law and economics.
How did
this happen? Millions of dollars spent
over decades have made the doctrine appear legitimate and unimpeachable,
despite regularly failing a simple smell test. The combination of sponsored researchers, well-funded
institutes, foundations, think tanks, and advocacy groups, all-expense
paid seminars, endowed professorships, and the like have paid off. Sponsored researchers create a plethora of
work, framed as academic contributions, but designed to achieve support for a predetermined
outcome. The process continues and builds on itself as sponsored researchers cite
the prior work of sponsored researchers.
Over time, clearly results driven advocacy documents acquire the
legitimacy and credibility of unsponsored work aiming to seek the truth. In fact, sponsored research can crowd out
work that does not have the public outreach and cheerleading provided by
stakeholders.
The whole
process "stinks to high heaven."
Just now, sponsored researchers are noting that the proposed merger guidelines
would harm the credibility of both DoJ and FTC, apparently before the court of
public opinion and judges. Of course,
these very same pundits have the financial incentive to impeach the credibility
of these government agencies and deem the proposed guidelines harmful, ill
conceived, and bullying.
It's a
racket as my wife would say. I am
certain that so-called consumer stakeholders also have financial underwriters
singing the praises of the proposed guidelines. However, these groups have
substantially less funding available, because few stakeholders can see the
direct monetary harm that would result from implementation of the guidelines.
I understand
that sponsored researchers often have the ongoing financial burden of having to
generate annually enough "soft money" to keep graduate students
employed. Sadly, that necessity has become yet another reason for the rats to
proliferate.