Award Winning Blog

Showing posts with label space debris. Show all posts
Showing posts with label space debris. Show all posts

Thursday, February 5, 2026

SpaceX Proposes a Million More Satellites on Paper

           SpaceX has filed a groundbreaking proposal to launch and operate one million small satellites as a data center in space. See https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/icfs?id=ibfs_application_summary&number=SAT-LOA-20260108-00016. 

          My two immediate reactions: Wow! and Is There Less Than Meets the Eye?

          First the Wow!  In the spirit of moving fast and subverting conventional wisdom, SpaceX and Elon Musk have turned the AI and Data Center topography upside down.  Launch a massive constellation of small satellites in Low Earth Orbit and the gravitational pulls from water, electric power, and real estate issues, as well as many unresolved regulatory, international law, and U.S. treaty commitments evaporate. Poof!

          Is this a great country or what?

          With this filing, Space X proposes to increase the number of orbiting spacecraft from about 12,000 to 1,112,000 (European Space Agency non space data center forecast of 100,000 satellites by 2030 (see https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Sets/Space_Debris_Is_it_a_Crisis).

LEO orbiting satellites will not deplete any scarce terrestrial resources. Surely Artificial Intelligence applications will get a boost as will U.S. competition to maintain global technological, military, and commercial space supremacy.  At least conceptually, we consumers of data center and broadband service should benefit from faster, better, smarter, cheaper, and sustainable cheaper goods and services.

          What’s not to like?

          A lot, which leads me to: Is There Less Than Meets the Eye?

          While admiring the quest to capture first mover market advantages and public imagination, I hereby throw cold water, aluminum particles and gas from vaporizing space junk, and other inconvenient, but not easily ignored issues, making the project far less than it appears from recent headlines and social network posts.

          First, consider the number of exceptions SpaceX wants the FCC to issue.  For a summary of the waiver requests, see https://www.fcc.gov/document/sb-accepts-filing-spacexs-application-orbital-data-centers. In simple English, SpaceX wants the FCC to treat the application exclusively and not in the customary filing window where other similar applications would get considered at the same time.    

            SpaceX also wants exemption from all milestone requirements and deployment obligations meaning that it has no deadlines and benchmarks to satisfy as proof of ongoing progress toward complete deployment of satellites and the start of service. Contrast that request with Elon Musk’s forecast that the data center in space will reach a critical mass in 30-36 months from now with more AI space launches than terrestrial expansion within 5 years. See https://finance.yahoo.com/news/elon-musk-getting-serious-orbital-185049655.html.

          Despite its considerable access to internal and external funding befitting a venture with an estimated value of $1 trillion, SpaceX seeks the waiver of all surety bond requirements and obligations. Lastly, SpaceX wants to work on its ambitious project without disclosing technical details such as channel plans for licensed beams, uplink and downlink beams, command beams, and orbital plane configurations.

          If the FCC were to grant such an extensive waiver wish list, SpaceX would have quite limited obligations to disclose how its space data center would operate and whether other competing satellite constellations could share that part of LEO having the right combination of solar power potential and heat discharge.

          There is a growing list of chronic and emerging issues that call into question whether space, as enormous as it is, can accommodate 1 million more LEO satellites in relatively close proximity to each other. Space tourism, asteroid mining for scare minerals, and the colonization of the Moon and Mars, also will require shared access.  A massive increase in spacecraft, coupled with an expectation that earth hostilities will have a space surveillance, military, and warfare component substantially raise the odds for collisions, as well as an increase in toxicity from spacecraft launches and vaporization when falling back to earth.

          The SpaceX grand proposal reminds me of the absolute necessity of having both full disclosure of technical, operational, radio spectrum, and orbital plane usage, coupled with a realistic timeline for starting service.  Without these requirements, and “skin the game” financial commitments, subject to forfeiture, SpaceX can, worse case, propose nothing more than a paper satellite constellation that could chill investment in competing, perhaps less ambitious but more timely and practical projects.

          It makes sense to consider the six pages of conditions imposed by the FCC for StarLink’s second generation broadband network. See https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-36A1.pdf.

          If the FCC wants to remain true to its “Open Skies,” procompetitive ethos, it has to offer flexibility in its processing of innovative service applications, but also guard against ambitious paper satellite proposals designed to preempt competition and corner a market years before the first of one million satellites reaches orbit.

              

Monday, June 2, 2025

New Publication: Rob Frieden, Dangers from Regulatory Vacuums in Outer, Inner, and Near Space, 90 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (2025)

 

ABSTRACT 

            Space, "the final frontier," has become an attractive, but increasingly risky market for both public and private investments.  Gold rush enthusiasm anticipates solutions to the Digital Divide via small low earth orbiting satellites, extraction of valuable minerals from asteroids, a vibrant space launch and tourism industry, and expanding earth observation opportunities.  Such entrepreneurial boldness juxtaposes with a severe lag in government oversight, consumer safeguards, and essential operational guardrails. The ambitious plans of Elon Musk and other space entrepreneurs could fail, despite recent market success, as SpaceX’s plans for 148 rocket launches in 2024.

            Without substantial refinement of global space treaties and effective national regulation, expanding and imprudent use of space resources could trigger "the tragedy of the commons," rendering the most valuable regions of space unusable. Satellites could collide, or strike orbiting debris at extremely high speeds.  Accidental collisions are more likely in a crowded orbital region, such as 200-1200 miles above earth where low earth orbiting satellites operate.

            A much more costly calamity can occur when a valuable, fully operational satellite collides with space debris, such as a deactivated satellite, or when it becomes a target in a test of anti-satellite (“ASAT”) technology.  The likelihood of a space object collisions increases substantially when space faring nations and private ventures do not nudge no longer useful objects upward, farther into deep space, or on a downward trajectory toward earth that would guarantee complete vaporization.  The testing and future use of ASAT technology risks “weaponizing” space, despite treaty-level commitments to use it solely for peaceful purposes, benefitting everyone.

            This article explains how national governments have generated or tolerated the proliferation of space debris to potentially dangerous levels of space debris without penalty. It explains how intergovernmental agreements, such as the five space treaties administered by the United Nations, and the space/spectrum management agreements of the International Telecommunication Union, have not required space debris mitigation, nor sanctioned operators responsible for generating more space debris.

            The failure to address and resolve proliferating space debris from ASATs and abandoned space objects will increase the potential for calamities that render space access too risky. The article identifies how intergovernmental agreements can mandate space debris mitigation, impose sanctions for noncompliance, and create financial incentives for recycling and removing existing debris.

 

 

Saturday, February 15, 2025

Add Millions More to the Musk Account

           A Feb. 11th New York Times article missed a sizeable subsidy from the Federal Communications Commission that will add millions of dollars more to subsidies flowing to Elon Musk’s commercial ventures.  See (Elon Musk’s Business Empire Scores Benefits Under Trump Shake-Up; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/11/us/politics/elon-musk-companies-conflicts.html.

            Under new leadership, the FCC will reverse a prior determination that Starlink, does qualify for universal service funding, because the low earth orbiting network has substantially higher cost of service compared to terrestrial options, and it does not meet baseline requirements on data speed and reliability. This means Mr. Musk's Starlink venture will qualify for over $800 million in subsidies aiming to bridge the Digital Divide.  

            Consistent with FCC Chairman Carr's game plan, set out in the Heritage Foundation Project 2025, https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf, the FCC will exempt Starlink from essential environmental regulations. When launching thousands of satellites, Starlink significantly adds toxic gas into the atmosphere.  These satellites have a short operational life and their descent back to earth releases more toxicity from the incomplete vaporization of aluminum and other particles.  

 

Wednesday, January 29, 2025

Two Works in Progress on Threats to Space Commerce

     My current research agenda focuses on the growing threats to space commerce from space debris, the growing risk that space will become weaponized as a new theater of warfare, anti-satellite testing, spacecraft collisions, atmospheric pollution, unenforceable treaties, and regulatory uncertainty. The papers are available at: https://hq.ssrn.com/submissions/MyPapers.cfm?partid=102928

    Here are the two abstracts:

    Dangers From the Regulatory Vacuums in Outer, Inner, and Near Space

         Space, "the final frontier," has become an attractive, but increasingly risky market for both public and private investments.  Gold rush enthusiasm anticipates solutions to the Digital Divide via small low earth orbiting satellites, extraction of valuable minerals from asteroids, a vibrant space launch and tourism industry, and expanding earth observation opportunities.  Such entrepreneurial boldness juxtaposes with a severe lag in government oversight, consumer safeguards, and essential operational guardrails. The ambitious plans of Elon Musk and other space entrepreneurs could fail, despite recent market success, as SpaceX’s plans for 148 rocket launches in 2024.

    Without substantial refinement of global space treaties and effective national regulation, expanding and imprudent use of space resources could trigger "the tragedy of the commons," rendering the most valuable regions of space unusable. Satellites could collide, or strike orbiting debris at extremely high speeds.  Accidental collisions are more likely in a crowded orbital region, such as 200-1200 miles above earth where low earth orbiting satellites operate

    A much more costly calamity can occur when a valuable, fully operational satellite collides with space debris, such as a deactivated satellite, or when it becomes a target in a test of anti-satellite (“ASAT”) technology.  The likelihood of a space object collisions increases substantially when space faring nations and private ventures do not nudge no longer useful objects upward, farther into deep space, or on a downward trajectory toward earth that would guarantee complete vaporization.  The testing and future use of ASAT technology risks “weaponizing” space, despite treaty-level commitments to use it solely for peaceful purposes, benefitting everyone.

    This article explains how national governments have generated or tolerated the proliferation of space debris to potentially dangerous levels of space debris without penalty. It explains how intergovernmental agreements, such as the five space treaties administered by the United Nations, and the space/spectrum management agreements of the International Telecommunication Union, have not required space debris mitigation, nor sanctioned operators responsible for generating more space debris.

    The failure to address and resolve proliferating space debris from ASATs and abandoned space objects will increase the potential for calamities that render space access too risky. The article identifies how intergovernmental agreements can mandate space debris mitigation, impose sanctions for noncompliance, and create financial incentives for recycling and removing existing debris.

 Assessing the Impact of the Great Power Competition on Space Commerce

        Just as space commerce appears to have reached a critical mass, competing national government interests can thwart progress with strategies and tactics that increase market risk, volatility, and uncertainty. Despite universal support for a treaty-level commitment to pursue only peaceful activities, for the benefit of everyone, unilateral actions by the governments of China, Russia, the United States have the potential to disrupt markets and even weaponize space.  The five international treaties on space-related activities cannot foreclose weaponization of space as a likely new theater of warfare.

      So-called Great Power Competition has generated high stakes rivalry to retain or secure supremacy in military, political, economic, and societal spheres. The battle for a competitive advantage has the potential to reduce or even thwart continuing success in space markets, because conflict and rivalry on earth includes an increasingly volatile above ground component.

      This paper assesses two conflicting trends.  On one hand, space commerce in 2023 generated an estimated $630 billion in economic activity, rising to a potential $1.8 trillion by 2035. Low Earth Orbiting satellite constellations have the potential to bridge the Digital Divide by providing a reliable infrastructure for widely available and affordable broadband access, even in remote, rural, and impoverished locales throughout the world. Other developing market opportunities include development of a vibrant space launch and tourism industry, space exploration, colonization of the Moon and Mars and an expanded array of services via commercial satellites.

           On the other hand, longstanding and emerging challenges in outer space may shift from chronic and unresolved, to acute and potentially catastrophic. National governments and private ventures can avoid triggering worst case scenarios only if they accept compulsory limits on space weapons testing and use, coupled with effective measures to reduce the risk of collisions with discarded or active spacecraft.  

          The paper identifies the most pressing and emerging quandaries, many of which result from a nation’s failure to comply with limitations on space activity broadly framed by space treaties entered into force over 40 years ago. Because governments of the world have not reached consensus on whether and how to modernize the treaties, the currently in force agreements do not address market entry by private ventures, lack an enforcement mechanism to compel compliance, and rely primarily on the good will of all countries to support noble aspirations that increasingly deviate from individual national interests.  

          Recent deployment of unconventional space objects by China and Russia point to near term use of technologies for enhanced surveillance, and disruption, or even destruction of quite valuable in-space assets.  A national campaign to promote the acquisition of comparatively more power and leadership in space, by both the public and private sectors, can have consequences underappreciated in their severity.  

          The paper also explains how emerging technologies and business plans contribute to both revenue enhancement and greater risk of calamity. It offers specific recommendations on what unconditional and immediate commitments national governments and private ventures must make to avoid potential ruination of space.

            

Friday, January 3, 2025

Unintended Consequences When the FCC Cannot Use Its Expertise and Respond to Changed Circumstances

          The conservative majority in the Supreme Court has worked tirelessly to prevent regulatory agencies from using their expertise to assess how changed circumstances affect statutory authority.  See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024); available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf; (overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/837/.       

          While I appreciate that the FCC can overreach, I worry that the Court has blithely ignored two serious problems it has created:

1)       It looks like the impact of non-deference forecloses even independent regulatory agencies, like the FCC, from interpreting laws that Congress did not, or could not future proof.  For example, the last major amendment to baseline telecommunications law occurred in 1996, with no assessment of how broadband and the Internet fundamentally change information, communications, and entertainment markets.

          Rather than defer to the FCC’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory authorization, the Court requires explicit and properly tailored legislation.  Congress has developed a loathsome reputation for not assessing what legislative amendments and additions are necessary and overdue.  If Congress predictably fails to act, then obsolete and quite probably harmful statutory language persists.

2)       Court appears more inclined to use non-deference as a basis for preventing regulatory agencies from expanding jurisdiction to address new and potentially severe quandaries.  It is easy to reverse an expansive or re-regulatory initiative as the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals did in its rejection of the Democratic majority FCC’s effort to interpret broadband access as a telecommunications service. See https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0002p-06.pdf.

          Going forward, will courts apply non-deference to regulatory expansion clearly responding to a problem, which not addressed would trigger severe, quantifiable harm?  

          For example, the FCC has limited and ambiguous authority to assess the environmental impacts of telecommunications service providers.  See https://www.fcc.gov/general/nepa-faq. Reviewing courts and sponsored advocates already consider the scope of FCC space environment oversight quite limited, See, e.g., https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1337/22-1337-2024-07-12.html; https://techfreedom.org/fcc-lacks-statutory-authority-and-expertise-for-outer-space-activities/, despite the irrefutable fact that spacecraft reentry has significant, adverse impact on the earth’s atmosphere and the pace of global warming. See, e.g., https://indico.esa.int/event/493/timetable/?view=standard_inline_minutes.

          The vast increase in space launches and injection of toxic gases and particles, including aluminum oxide, from space objects reentering earth’s atmosphere raise questions about future sustainability of space and the impact of on earth’s atmosphere. Even the complete vaporization of space objects appears to have potentially hazardous impacts on the environment below. “In a series of high-altitude research flights over Alaska and the U.S. Midwest in March and April, researchers sampled stratospheric air using specialized mass spectrometers. They discovered surprising amounts of many metals commonly used in rockets and satellites, often in ratios mirroring those found in specific high-performance aerospace alloys. The investigation revealed that the metals are accumulating within sulfuric acid particles, which constitute most of the stratosphere’s particulates and influence our world’s ozone layer and climate.” Leonard David & Lee Billings, Space Junk Is Polluting Earth’s Stratosphere with Vaporized Metal, Scientific American (Oct. 26, 2023); https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-is-polluting-earths-stratosphere-with-vaporized-metal/.

          Would any reviewing court affirm a decision of the FCC to expand its regulatory oversight and require space ventures to assess the environmental impact of its vastly expanded launch and spacecraft vaporization activities?  I do not think so, particularly for any venture led by Elon Musk. See https://ehtrust.org/federal-court-rules-in-favor-of-fcc-space-x-can-launch-thousands-of-satellites-without-environmental-review/

          What court would risk being overturned by the Supreme Court for considering it rational and consistent with statutory authority for the FCC to make some assessment of the impact on earth from toxic emissions above? 

Monday, June 24, 2024

Emerging Private Lawsuits for Damages from Falling Space Debris

   Emerging Private Lawsuits for Damages from Falling Space Debris

            When authorizing the dumping of spent nickel-hydrogen batteries from the International Space (https://images.nasa.gov/details/iss064e041512) NASA’s managers expected all of the 5800 pounds to vaporize in a few years, after picking up speed and encountering atmospheric friction before landfall (https://www.npr.org/2024/06/23/nx-s1-5016923/space-debris-nasa-florida-home-lawsuit). Surprisingly, 1.6 pounds of the space debris survived the 260 mile high speed fall, back to earth.  The metal object damaged the roof of a private residence in Naples, Florida (https://www.clickorlando.com/news/local/2024/06/23/florida-family-sues-nasa-after-piece-of-space-station-crashed-through-homes-roof/).  Having no likely recourse to recover repair costs from a standard insurance policy, the homeowners lawyered up to file a claim in federal court (https://www.cshlaw.com/news/mica-nguyen-worthy-submits-first-of-its-kind-claim-to-nasa-seeking-recovery-from-damages-sustained-from-space-debris/).

             To its credit, NASA acknowledged having owned and jettisoned the material, thereby removing one of the litigation defense strategies it could have used to deny any financial responsibility (https://blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2024/04/15/nasa-completes-analysis-of-recovered-space-object/).  However, NASA will have plenty of other legal defenses if it opts not to pay a small sum to make the problem go away.

             Space debris, usually weighing far more than a few pounds, often arrives partially intact. Because about 71% of earth is salt water, (https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/ocean/), the odds favor “no harm, no foul.” In November, 2022, a 23-ton Chinese used rocket launch stage fell harmlessly into the Pacific Ocean (See China Lucks Out Again as Out-of-Control Rocket Booster Falls in the Pacific; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/04/science/china-rocket-debris.html).

             The sharp increase in space launches, particularly ones installing satellites in low earth orbit, 200-1200 miles above, sharply increases the odds for future collisions and space debris landfalls.  While global space treaties establish a right of recovery for damages caused in space, no enforcement mechanism exists.  Additionally, the treaties do not recognize private parties both in terms of having responsibility for causing harm and having a right to seek damages when harmed by a space object.  NASA also might argue the space treaties have no applicability for domestic disputes when both parties reside in the same country.

             Even as it removes the evidentiary question of who and what caused the damage, NASA may assert that a private, U.S. citizen has no legal basis (standing) to recover the cost of the roof repair.  Sovereign immunity insulates government agencies from lawsuits.  NASA might even claim that natural (e.g., meteorites) and man-made, space debris regularly fall to earth and private property owners have to bear the risk—a sort of force majeure.  Bad things happen through no fault of either party.

             Although I doubt it, this first of its kind private litigation may establish the basis for private recovery by a U.S. citizen for harm occurring domestically.  Congress may enact legislation requiring insurance by private ventures and specify a conditional private right of legal action against federal government agencies, such as NASA.  On the other hand, states with growing space commerce, such as space tourism, may explicitly exempt or cap liability, as recently done in Florida (https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/article/florida-moves-limit-spaceflight-liability).

             I think NASA management will try to prevent this case from establishing a precedent.  It can do this by offering compensation outside the court room in exchange for non-disclosure.

 

           

 

                     

Friday, October 28, 2022

New Publication on Space Junk and Anti-Satellite Warfare

Senior Russian government officials have threated to destroy U.S. satellites.  See https://www.livemint.com/news/world/russia-threats-to-hit-us-satellites-if-it-continues-to-11666885278398.html; https://arstechnica.com/science/2022/10/russia-threatens-a-retaliatory-strike-against-us-commercial-satellites/;https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-wests-commercial-satellites-could-be-targets-2022-10-27/.

Also, this week, the International Space Station, yet again, has needed to change orbit to avoid a possible collision with Russian space debris. See https://blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2022/10/24/space-station-maneuvers-to-avoid-orbital-debris/; https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/25/world/iss-maneuver-russia-space-junk-scn; https://www.npr.org/2022/10/26/1131374307/international-space-station-junk-debris-problem-satellite.

I am pleased to announce publication of a paper that explains how anti-satellite warfare and space junk make it more difficult for nations to agree on rules for sharing space and radio spectrum resources: 

See https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/telecommunications-policy/vol/46/issue/10.

Here’s the abstract:

This paper explains why the coordination of satellite orbits and spectrum use among nations have become more contentious and less routine.  The potential for greater risks, delays, and conflicts occurs, despite treaty-level commitments to promote the peaceful uses of outer space and efficient and equitable access to radio spectrum and satellite orbits. Heretofore, specialized sectors of the United Nations (“UN”) have worked effectively in forging multilateral consensus on these matters.

The paper explains why the coordination of satellite orbits and spectrum use among nations may become more contentious and protracted. The potential for greater risks, delays, and conflicts may occur, despite treaty-level commitments by most nations to promote the peaceful uses of outer space and access to radio spectrum and satellite orbits free of signal interference and collision risk. Heretofore, specialized sectors of the United Nations (“UN”) have worked effectively in forging multilateral consensus on these matters.

Since the onset of artificial satellite technology, the UN has created five space-related treaties covering such issues such as freedom of exploration, liability for damage caused by space objects, the prevention of harmful interference with space activities and the environment, the notification and registration of space activities, exploitation of natural resources in outer space and the settlement of disputes. The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), a specialized agency of the UN, has largely achieved the goal of preventing harmful signal interference, formulating technical standards promoting equipment compatibility, and establishing uniform operational rules of the road.  Until now, month long ITU spectrum planning conferences have reached closure on both mundane and critical matters, albeit at a slow and methodical pace. 

The paper explains how several chronic and emerging factors present challenges to the successful record of multilateral consensus building on space and spectrum issues.  The likelihood of collisions of spacecraft with other objects, including space debris and harmful signal interference has increased, because then United States has opted to make domestic satellite rules and frequency allocations in advance of final ITU consideration.  Additionally, China and Russia have sought an expansion of the ITU’s mission to include elements of Internet governance that could promote balkanization of Internet access and legitimize efforts by individual nations to surveil and control access to broadband networks.

The paper assesses whether and how UN agencies can continue to establish timely and effective policies and procedures for reducing space debris and the potential for spacecraft collisions, and preventing harmful signal interference.  The paper concludes that China, Russia, and the U.S., should renew efforts to promote collegiality, consensus building, and longstanding, shared goals.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tuesday, November 16, 2021

A RUSSIA Acronym: Ruthlessly Undermining Small Satellite International Access

            In a universally contemned, knucklehead move, the Russian government used an anti-satellite missile to pulverize a deactivated satellite located in a low earth orbit 40 miles below the known trajectory of the International Space Station.  See, e.g., https://www.reuters.com/world/us-military-reports-debris-generating-event-outer-space-2021-11-15/; https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-5929910; https://apnews.com/article/space-exploration-science-business-697f5aa719331ab6e74102ebb06b52d8.

            Before explaining how this bonehead action did not have to risk life and property, let us make two contestable assumptions for the sake of argument:

1)         Anti-satellite technology has some legitimate and lawful, national defense uses, so the Russian technology test comports with the global treaty limiting space exploration and exploitation to “peaceful uses” “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.”  See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, available at: http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html; and

2)         Russian personnel determined that the test would not damage the International Space Station, or trigger any other sort of liability for harm, even though over 1500 additional pieces of space debris were created at a location certain to fall down toward earth and cross over the Space Station orbit.  See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; available at: http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html.

Arguably, nations need to test anti-satellite technology under actual orbital conditions rather than blow up a mockup satellite on the ground.  There must be some benefit in examining the breadth and depth of a blown-up satellite debris field.  But did Russia have to target a dead satellite so close to, and above, the Space Station?

           News flash: both operational and out of service satellites experience gravity that pulls them down toward earth.  Most active satellites use “station keeping” fuel to maintain orbit, particularly geostationary satellites designed to last over ten years and to hover in a fixed location 22,300 miles above the equator.  Low earth orbiting satellites typically have short useable lives with no station keeping capability.  Their close proximity to earth offers a different value proposition: lower costs to build, launch and access, but short usable lives and the need to launch thousands of small “cubesats” to achieve ubiquitous coverage.

           Russian officials have yet to explain why they could not have identified and targeted a dead satellite located well below the Space Station.  Every other publicly disclosed satellite explosion has occurred in a location not likely to trigger any immediate collision, even though the debris field might eventually increase the odds.   The U.S., China, and India have complied with this safeguard.

            Luckily, the occupants of the Space Station, including two Russian cosmonauts, avoided harm, but the odds for a collision increase, even without the deliberate increase in the amount of space junk.  New broadband low earth orbiting satellite constellations, operate near each other and number in the thousands.  Even in low earth orbit, only a few hundred miles from earth, tiny specks of debris travel at speeds in excess of 15,000 miles per hour.

            If you have had a car windshield crack from a stone thrown at it by a truck, you can appreciate the potential for damage from small objects with high velocity. In low earth orbit low gravity and extreme speed combine to create the real potential for more than a crack or divot.  The worse case scenario, known as the Kepler Syndrome, (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) renders most, if not all, of space unable to support satellite networks, because of the ever increasing risk of collisions.

            Way to go Russia!

 

      

          

Sunday, March 1, 2020

The New York Times Errs in Coverage of Satellite Life Extension


Every once in a while, I spot an error in The New York Times and dutifully report it.  I have never received confirmation, much less a correction, even when I detected woefully wrong foreign currency conversions in the Travel section.  I did get a snarky email suggesting that I could not possibly have grounds to dispute the Times’ use of the inter-bank rate plus 2%.  Call me crazy, but travelers typically receive conversion well below the inter-bank rate.  The 2% figure should have been a reduction.

Recently, the Times reporters have not done an adequate job learning and explaining how the Intelsat 901 satellite will achieve a usable life extension from the Northrop Grumman MEV-1.  While future repair satellites will replenish so-called station keeping fuel inside the tanks of the satellite targeted for repair, the current MEV-1 latches onto the satellite and stays there for five years.

As explained by the manufacturer of MEV-1 (Northrop Grumman):

"MEV is designed to dock to geostationary satellites whose fuel is nearly depleted. Once connected to its client satellite, MEV uses its own thrusters and fuel supply to extend the satellite’s lifetime. When the customer no longer desires MEV’s service, the spacecraft will undock and move on to the next client satellite." See https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/space-logistics-services/mission-extension-vehicle/

The Sketchbook on page 3 of the Sunday March 1, 2020 edition incorrectly reported that the satellites will "part" in a month.  

If the Times reporters had done their homework more thoroughly, they might have come across accounts in Space News: "MEV-1 will remain attached to Intelsat-901 and use its own thrusters to keep the satellite properly oriented in orbit." See: https://spacenews.com/northrop-grummans-mev-1-servicer-docks-with-intelsat-satellite/: 


The MEV-1 takes over the functions of pointing the Intelsat satellite correctly down to earth and also that the MEV-1 will use its thrusters to keep the Intelsat satellite in the proper orbital parking place:

"The next day Northrop Grumman moved MEV-1 next to Intelsat-901 and docked with the satellite using a capture mechanism that went “through the throat” of Intelsat-901’s apogee engine, Anderson said." (also from Space News: https://spacenews.com/northrop-grummans-mev-1-servicer-docks-with-intelsat-satellite/.

I am pretty sure I will not hear from a real person acknowledging and correcting mistakes in this newspaper of record.   What could I possibly know better than the Times reporters?