Unintended Consequences When the FCC Cannot Use Its Expertise and Respond to Changed Circumstances

          The conservative majority in the Supreme Court has worked tirelessly to prevent regulatory agencies from using their expertise to assess how changed circumstances affect statutory authority.  See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024); available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf; (overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/837/.       

          While I appreciate that the FCC can overreach, I worry that the Court has blithely ignored two serious problems it has created:

1)       It looks like the impact of non-deference forecloses even independent regulatory agencies, like the FCC, from interpreting laws that Congress did not, or could not future proof.  For example, the last major amendment to baseline telecommunications law occurred in 1996, with no assessment of how broadband and the Internet fundamentally change information, communications, and entertainment markets.

          Rather than defer to the FCC’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory authorization, the Court requires explicit and properly tailored legislation.  Congress has developed a loathsome reputation for not assessing what legislative amendments and additions are necessary and overdue.  If Congress predictably fails to act, then obsolete and quite probably harmful statutory language persists.

2)       Court appears more inclined to use non-deference as a basis for preventing regulatory agencies from expanding jurisdiction to address new and potentially severe quandaries.  It is easy to reverse an expansive or re-regulatory initiative as the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals did in its rejection of the Democratic majority FCC’s effort to interpret broadband access as a telecommunications service. See https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0002p-06.pdf.

          Going forward, will courts apply non-deference to regulatory expansion clearly responding to a problem, which not addressed would trigger severe, quantifiable harm?  

          For example, the FCC has limited and ambiguous authority to assess the environmental impacts of telecommunications service providers.  See https://www.fcc.gov/general/nepa-faq. Reviewing courts and sponsored advocates already consider the scope of FCC space environment oversight quite limited, See, e.g., https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1337/22-1337-2024-07-12.html; https://techfreedom.org/fcc-lacks-statutory-authority-and-expertise-for-outer-space-activities/, despite the irrefutable fact that spacecraft reentry has significant, adverse impact on the earth’s atmosphere and the pace of global warming. See, e.g., https://indico.esa.int/event/493/timetable/?view=standard_inline_minutes.

          The vast increase in space launches and injection of toxic gases and particles, including aluminum oxide, from space objects reentering earth’s atmosphere raise questions about future sustainability of space and the impact of on earth’s atmosphere. Even the complete vaporization of space objects appears to have potentially hazardous impacts on the environment below. “In a series of high-altitude research flights over Alaska and the U.S. Midwest in March and April, researchers sampled stratospheric air using specialized mass spectrometers. They discovered surprising amounts of many metals commonly used in rockets and satellites, often in ratios mirroring those found in specific high-performance aerospace alloys. The investigation revealed that the metals are accumulating within sulfuric acid particles, which constitute most of the stratosphere’s particulates and influence our world’s ozone layer and climate.” Leonard David & Lee Billings, Space Junk Is Polluting Earth’s Stratosphere with Vaporized Metal, Scientific American (Oct. 26, 2023); https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-is-polluting-earths-stratosphere-with-vaporized-metal/.

          Would any reviewing court affirm a decision of the FCC to expand its regulatory oversight and require space ventures to assess the environmental impact of its vastly expanded launch and spacecraft vaporization activities?  I do not think so, particularly for any venture led by Elon Musk. See https://ehtrust.org/federal-court-rules-in-favor-of-fcc-space-x-can-launch-thousands-of-satellites-without-environmental-review/

          What court would risk being overturned by the Supreme Court for considering it rational and consistent with statutory authority for the FCC to make some assessment of the impact on earth from toxic emissions above? 

Holiday Reading Part Two

Here's a work in progress that considers the middle ground in the network neutrality debate: Do Conduit Neutrality Mandates Promote or Hinder Trust in Internet-Mediated Transactions?.

The abstract for the paper:

As the Internet evolves and matures, Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) have begun to create increasingly diversified business models for serving downstream end users and upstream content providers. Increasing subscriber demand for broadband connections necessitates efforts to identify and serve new profit centers and to differentiate retail and wholesale users on the basis of subscriber bandwidth requirements and other customer-specific demand characteristics. ISPs have identified new strategies to differentiate their offerings on the basis of price, quality of service, transmission speeds, permissible amount of capacity uploaded and downloaded, legitimate network management objectives and the demand for customer-specified network features.

Advocates for limiting price and service discrimination contend that absent a “network neutrality” mandate, ISPs will discriminate in ways that harm competitors by favoring corporate affiliates and selected third parties. Network neutrality supporters claim that ISPs have both the incentive and ability to engage in harmful discrimination, typically characterized by ISPs as necessary network management, or a legitimate response to the specific requirements of a customer.

This paper will consider ISP conduit neutrality in the context of whether and how legislatures and national regulatory authorities can enhance trust and network reliability. The paper assesses how network management techniques can offer both quality of service improvements and deliberately inferior service. Because technological innovations provide the ability to build trust in Internet-mediated transactions, the paper will identify legislative and regulatory strategies that promote network management that enhances cloud computing, electronic commerce and other transactions without according ISPs unconditional opportunities also to harm competition and consumers.

Does Judicial Deference Cleve Along a Deregulation/Expanded Regulation Axis?

By all accounts it appeals that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals expressed great skepticism with the FCC’s claimed ancillary jurisdiction to sanction Comcast for meddling with peer-to-peer traffic of its subscribers. I share that concern for two reasons: 1) on administrative law grounds, the FCC should have initiated a notice and comment rulemaking before applying what sure looks like enforced rules; and 2) the FCC stretches the concept of ancillary jurisdiction in Title I of the Communications Act and then justifies the stretch primarily on Title II common carrier regulatory sections that offer a general sense that the FCC should promote access to the Internet and “advanced telecommunications capability.”

The D.C. Circuit surely has ample grounds to reverse the FCC, but if it were to do so what does such action mean in the broader context of judicial deference to the expertise of a regulatory agency and the scope of statutory interpretation accorded these agencies? Bear in mind that a majority of the Supreme Court in the Brand X case (affirming the FCC’s decision to treat cable modem Internet access as an information service) was quite willing to defer to the FCC in terms of its technical expertise and also on so-called Chevron grounds that the FCC reasonably interpreted ambiguous legislation.

So if the D.C. Circuit does not defer, does that mean that at least as to this fact pattern the FCC was unreasonable in its statutory interpretation and no degree of technical expertise can provide a cure? It also just so happens that the Supreme Court deferred to the FCC on a decision that appeared to generate a deregulatory outcome, while the D.C. Circuit’s likely non-deference applies to an expansion of the FCC’s regulatory wingspan.

Summary of FCC's Rulemaking on Net Neutrality and Preserving the Open Internet

Consistent with President Obama’s campaign promise to support network neutrality, the FCC has issued a broad sweeping Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to codify the four Internet principles adopted by the Commission in 2005[1] along with two additional principles requiring nondiscrimination and transparency. [2] With the two Republican Commissioners dissenting in part and concurring in part,[3] the FCC has only started the controversial process for assessing what enforceable rules it should establish for regulating Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), and possibly applications and content providers in certain instances, [4]independent of additional statutory authority. Because the FCC currently only had articulated a Policy Statement on the topic and because the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by statute remains uncertain, the FCC seeks to establish “rules to preserve an open Internet—the next step in an ongoing and longstanding effort at the Commission.” [5]

The FCC offers “draft rules, including a codification of the existing Internet policy principles, additional principles of nondiscrimination and transparency, [and] an acknowledgement that these principles apply to all forms of broadband Internet access . . .. [6] The Commission also proposes to exclude ‘managed’ or ‘specialized’ services” from network neutrality rules in light of the fact that that services such as IP-enabled ‘cable television, VoIP telephony, and specialized telemedicine [7] may not fit within the Commission’s definition of broadband Internet access [8] in light of the nature of these services and user requirements, i.e., the need for such “mission critical” bits to arrive without delay, possibly triggering prioritized processing which might otherwise constitute a violation of the Commission’s proposed nondiscrimination requirement.

The FCC proposes the following language as establishing the foundation for Internet neutrality with an emphasis on the wireline or wireless [9] link providing end users with access to the Internet [10]:

1. Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service may not prevent any of its users from sending or receiving the lawful content of the user’s choice over the Internet.

2. Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service may not prevent any of its users from running the lawful applications or using the lawful services of the user’s choice.

3. Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service may not prevent any of its users from connecting to and using on its network the user’s choice of lawful devices that do not harm the network.

4. Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service may not deprive any of its users of the user’s entitlement to competition among network providers, application providers, service providers, and content providers. [11]

5. Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service must treat lawful content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory manner. [12]

6. Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service must disclose such information concerning network management and other practices as is reasonably required for users and content, application, and service providers to enjoy the protections specified in this part.[13]

In addition to the exemption for managed and specialized services, the Commission proposes to exempt ISPs from having to comply with the six principles when reasonable network management, [14] law enforcement, [15] and public safety and homeland/national security factors [16] warrant.

The FCC concludes that it has jurisdiction to establish enforceable rules on Internet access notwithstanding the fact that ISPs provide information services explicitly exempt from common carrier regulation established in Title II of the Communications Act. [17] The Commission bases it lawful authority to regulate ISPs on the basis of “ancillary jurisdiction” conferred by Title I of the Communications Act [18]as well as Sections 201(b), 230(b) and 706(a) of the Communications Act.[19] The Commission expects to adjudicate violations on a case-by-case basis and solicits comments on what procedural rules to adopt that could lead to citations and financial penalties for noncompliance.




[1] Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) (2005).

[2] Preserving the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, GN Docket No. 09-191, FCC 09-93 (rel. Oct. 22, 2009); available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-93A1.doc.

[3] Commissioner McDowell stated that “I do not share the majority’s view that the Internet is showing breaks and cracks, nor do I believe that the government is the best tool to fix it. I also disagree with the premise that the Commission has the legal authority to regulate Internet network management as proposed.” Statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part, Id. at 96 (questioning the scope of the FCC’s Title I “ancillary jurisdiction” and whether Sections 230 and 706 of the Communications Act, as amended, provide “the ancillary hook.”

[4] “Although the question of Internet openness at the Commission has traditionally focused on providers of broadband Internet access service, we seek comment on the pros and cons of phrasing one or more of the Internet openness principles as obligations of other entities, in addition to providers of broadband Internet access service.” Id. at ¶101.

[5] Id. at ¶2.

[6] Id. at ¶11. The Commission identified a number of prior proceedings that it implies support the inference that the rulemaking constitutes a logical and lawful extension of previous work: “As this history illustrates, the Commission is not writing on a blank slate in this proceeding. Rather, we are proposing a next step—seeking public input on draft rules—that is based on a substantial record, which includes discussion of nondiscrimination, transparency, and application of Internet openness principles to wireless broadband Internet access service providers.” Id. at ¶46.

[7] See Id. at ¶108.

[8] The Commission proposes to define Broadband Internet access as “Internet Protocol data transmission between an end user and the Internet. For purposes of this definition, dial-up access requiring an end user to initiate a call across the public switched telephone network to establish a connection shall not constitute broadband Internet access.” Id. at p. 65, Appendix A, Draft Proposed Rules for Public Input, Part 8 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, §8.3 Definitions.

[9] “As our choices for accessing the Internet continue to increase, and as users connect to the Internet through different technologies, the principles we propose today seek to safeguard its openness for all users. We affirm that the six principles that we propose to codify today would apply to all platforms for broadband Internet access.” Id. at ¶154.

[10] “The rules we propose today address users’ ability to access the Internet and are not intended to regulate the Internet itself or create a different Internet experience from the one that users have come to expect. Instead, our proposals attempt to build on existing policies (discussed below) that have contributed to the Internet’s openness without imposing conditions that might diminish innovation or network investment. We seek to create a balanced framework that gives consumers and providers of Internet access, content, services, and applications the predictability and clarity they need going forward while retaining our ability to respond flexibly to new challenges.” Id. at ¶14.

[11] Rules one through four are set out at Id. ¶92.

[12] Id. at ¶104.

[13] Id. at ¶119.

[14] The FCC proposes to define reasonable network management as: “(a) reasonable practices employed by a provider of broadband Internet access service to (i) reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion on its network or to address quality-of-service concerns; (ii) address traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful; (iii) prevent the transfer of unlawful content; or (iv) prevent the unlawful transfer of content; and (b) other reasonable network management practices.” Id. at ¶135, Appendix A.

[15] “Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation a provider of broadband Internet access service may have—or limits its ability—to address the needs of law enforcement, consistent with applicable law.” Id. at ¶143, Appendix A.

[16] “Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation a provider of broadband Internet access service may have—or limits its ability—to deliver emergency communications, or to address the needs of public safety or national or homeland security authorities, consistent with applicable law.” Id. at ¶146, Appendix A.

[17] “Beginning in 2002, the Commission has classified cable modem service, wireline broadband Internet access service, wireless-enabled broadband Internet access service, and broadband-over-powerline-enabled Internet access service as information services, removing them from potential regulation under Title II of the Communications Act.” Id. at ¶29 (citations omitted).

[18] “We have ancillary jurisdiction over matters not directly addressed in the Act when the subject matter falls within the agency’s general statutory grant of jurisdiction and the regulation is “reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities.” That test is met with respect to broadband Internet access service.”
citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172–73 (1968); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662 (1972); Comcast Network Management Practices Order, 23 FCC Rcd at 13033–44, paras. 12–28; and the Commission’s Brief in Comcast v. FCC, No. 08-1291, at 25–50 (filed Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-293573A1.pdf.

[19] Section 201(b) authorizes the FCC “to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provision of th[e] Act.” 47 U.S.C. §201(b); Section 230(b)(1) states that “It is the policy of the United States-- (1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;” 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(1); 706(a) states that the Commission “shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.” 47 U.S.C. §706(a).

Does the FCC Have Jurisdiction to Regulate Wireless Handsets?

As the FCC launches a number of inquiries into the wireless marketplace, some opponents to such scrutiny have raised the argument that the FCC has no legal basis for regulating wireless handsets, much less interfere with exclusive distribution agreements. This strategy does inject fear, uncertainty and doubt possibly leading to the argument that regulatory uncertainty constitutes the sole basis for any finding of insufficient infrastructure investment. But is there a legal basis to the no jurisdiction argument?

As to the question about general jurisdiction, the FCC surely has a legal basis on grounds that wireless handsets are radiotransceivers. These devices transmit and receive using radio spectrum. The FCC has jurisdiction even over low powered devices that open garages, fly model planes, nuke food, and monitor baby sounds. No manufacturer of such spectrum using equipment can sell any device without certification by the FCC.

The harder question addresses whether the FCC can abrogate contracts between regulated carriers and unregulated ventures, such as Apple, regarding a regulated handset. I don’t have a definitive answer, but I can refer to a recent instance where the FCC did claim lawful authority to abrogate any and all types of exclusive service contracts between real estate owners of multiple dwelling units and a multichannel video program distributor. See Exclusive Service Contracts for Provision of Video Services in Multiple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Developments, MB Docket No. 07-51, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C. Rcd. 20235 (2007).

Arguably, if the FCC determines that the public interest justifies mandatory non-exclusivity, then the FCC can order the elimination of contracts that established exclusivity. I am sure sponsored researchers, wireless carriers, and handset manufacturers will try to find ways to distinguish video program service from wireless devices. But bear in mind that the FCC also rejects exclusivity for cable operator provided set top boxes, a device, and not a service.