Prospects for Widespread Access to Electric Vehicle Charging Stations: Insights From Telecommunications Technology Diffusion

            An energy reporter, for a major daily business publication, contacted me to understand how electric vehicle charging stations might become more readily available, particularly in rural locales. She wondered whether the fast take up of new telecommunications technologies, such as cellphones, cable television, and broadband, might offer insights on what works to jump start market penetration.

             Bear with me as this apparently geeky subject offers insights on when electric vehicles might reach critical mass, in time to achieve a significant reduction in greenhouse gasses.

             The reporter intrigued me with a curious question whether the fast proliferation of gas stations might provide a model for similar geographical market penetration by electric vehicle charging stations.  My small collection of vintage gas station published road maps confirms she may be onto something.           

 

             This late 1950s map of Iowa identifies locations where motorists can fill up with Skelly gasoline:

             Marketing 101 suggests that a companies can bolster brand loyalty by offering a product far and wide.  The map identified locations where motorists could find a Skelly station on the recently constructed Interstate 80.

             Access to EV charging follows a similar chicken/egg challenge: car buyers will become more inclined to buy an EV if they have confidence that access to charging stations will not create FUD: fear, uncertainty, and doubt.

             Several parallels in telecom provide insights on what business models work. 

 Cellular Radio

             Some of you might remember the bad old days when a lack of vigilance when “roaming” might result in a hefty and unexpected charge.  Before nationwide roaming, with “anytime, anywhere minutes,” the U.S. had many standalone, “independent” operators, primarily serving ex urban and rural locations.  These carriers made a killing by providing access to their networks by motorists speeding along a major Interstate highway.  Few noticed the icon on their handsets (or bag phones) showing that a call was being handled by another carrier.

             The major operators, such as Bell Atlantic, Pacific Telesis, Bell South, and Southwestern Bell eventually executed roaming agreements with the small, independent operators, thereby reducing or eliminating “non-network” roaming charges.  The end to unexpected, extortionate roaming charges helped expand subscribership and the eventual mergers and acquisitions that now leave us with only three national carriers.

 Cable Television

             Unlike cellular radio, cable television debuted in lots of rural areas at the same time, or even before urban service.  First generation cable was labeled Community Antenna Television, typically offered by local, “Mom and Pop” television sales and service ventures.  These entrepreneurs offered cable television, primarily to stimulate interest and demand for television sets.

             CATV market penetration occurred on small, town-by-town basis without coordination, or accrual of scale economies.  Rural residence, starved for any broadcast television reception, gladly paid for access to a few broadcast channels.  Their urban counterparts had free, off-air reception options.  Only after cable operators embraced satellite technology to deliver distant signals and new cable only content did national penetration and subscribership speed up.

 Broadband

             High speed Internet access provides a case study in a most desirable, but costly technology largely unavailable in rural locales unless and until, private and public actors subsidize access.  This technology has high startup costs that operators must bear before the first dollar arrives.  On the other hand, adding an additional subscriber typically has much lower, so-called incremental costs, especially for high density locales.

             A private venture might vertically integrate into the electric charging market to remove FUD, generate brand loyalty, and stimulate vehicles sales.  It might also install facilities using proprietary standards resulting in incompatibility with EVs manufactured by competitors. 

             A government agency might want to stimulate demand, but typically the legislature must enact laws creating tax incentives and financial subsidies.  Unless and until incentives are anticipated and/or funded a “Digital Divide” has resulted.  The Covid-19 pandemic underscores the consequences when broadband access is unavailable or deemed too costly.

             For broadband and EV charging, state and federal governments may have to create generous financial incentives to achieve anything close to ubiquitous access.  Early adopters might not need as much external funding, because they can anticipate market opportunities, such as when a national hotel chain prioritizes the installation of charging stations.

             In any event, the past technology adoption models may offer insights on this new challenge.

New pub: Assessing the need for More Incentives to Stimulate Next Generation Investment

    I loath the conversion of nouns into verbs, such as party and incentivize.  Perhaps this  picadillo prompted my latest publication in Vol. 7 of I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society.

    Here's the abstract:

     Incumbent carriers often vilify the regulatory process as a drain on efficiency and an unnecessary burden in light of robust marketplace competition.  Some claim that regulation creates disincentives for investing in expensive next generation networks (“NGNs”), and even accepting subsidies for broadband development if the carrier must provide access to competitors. Without fully assessing the necessity to do so legislators, regulators and judges have accepted the premise that government must create incentives for NGN investment. Incumbent carriers in particular have seized upon the concept of uncertainty as a justification for refraining from making necessary infrastructure investments, despite the onset of declining revenues and market shares in core services. 

     In the worst case scenario, incumbent carriers secure unwarranted and premature deregulation, despite an ongoing need for governments to guard against anticompetitive practices and to promote sustainable competition.  Governments also risk providing direct financial subsidies, or creating a regulatory mechanism for indirect subsidies, to stimulate infrastructure investment when no such catalyst is necessary in light of competitive necessity.  Once a subsidy mechanism is in place, government may not easily “wean” carriers off such artificial compensation.  In rare instances government may find some key carriers unwilling to accept subsidies and in turn disinclined to pursue expedited NGN development, as is currently occurring in the U.S., because incumbent carriers do not want to provide interconnection and access to competitors, a legal duty these carriers must bear when operating as common carrier providers of telecommunications networks, but which does not apply when these carriers offer information services which include broadband.

     This paper will examine how incumbent carriers in the United States have gamed the incentive creation process for maximum market distortion and competitive advantage.  The paper suggests that the U.S. government has rewarded incumbents with artificially lower risk, insulation from competition, and partial underwriting of technology projects that these carriers would have to undertake unilaterally.   The paper also examines the FCC’s recently released National Broadband Plan with an eye toward assessing whether the Commission has properly balanced incentive creation with competitive necessity.  The paper provides recommendations on how governments can calibrate the incentive creation process for maximum consumer benefit instead of individual carrier gain.

Which is the Primary Driver of Telecom Investment: Strategic Opportunities or Deregulation?

Incumbent carriers have spent millions on a campaign aiming to convince legislators and regulators that regulation all but eliminates incentives to invest in plant—particularly next generation networks.  The campaign also tries to make deregulation appear as the single greatest “incentivizer” for such investments.

Forget about strategic opportunities, the broader business cycle, the cost of capital, technological change and declining market share in core industry sectors.  What really matters is coming up with a way to dislodge the FCC and other government agencies from regulating.  Then and only then can the market drive investment decisions.

So let’s look at recent instances where incumbent carriers want to make investments.  Using the simplistic premise these ventures have spent millions to pitch, money should flow more freely into sectors recently subject to less regulation.  If deregulation is the primary driver—or apparently the only one—then investment should take the route where regulation offers the least degree of resistance and “disincentivization.”

           
Consider the primary multi-billion dollar investment goals of Comcast and Bell Canada Enterprises, the largest phone company and 9^th largest corporation in the country.  If deregulation drives investment decisions, then Comcast must want to acquire NBC because Congress and the FCC have streamlined and reduced regulatory oversight.  Similar deregulation must be occurring in Canada as BCE wants to acquire complete control of CTV, a major broadcast television network.

           
In reality two major cable and telephone companies wants to vertically integrate and acquire content for strategic reasons having quite little to do with regulation and recent changes in the scope of government oversight.  Broadcast deregulation did not make NBC and CTV more attractive.  The long term viability of Comcast and BCE drove these companies to think control of content might provide greater profitability in the long run.  

Comcast and other incumbents have successfully framed regulation and deregulation as the primary drivers of whether such companies will employ more people, and invest more money at the very same time as billions in retained earnings flow to buying still highly regulated assets.

           

Determining Causality in Telecommunications

With the FCC and most government actors obsessed with incentive creation, it makes sense to determine whether and how a regulatory or deregulatory action causes some desired outcome. Consider the creation of incentives to invest in physical plant. Incumbent carriers have spent a lot of time, money and effort arguing that regulation creates investment disincentives and deregulation does the desired opposite. This simplistic and not always correct premise constitutes the prevailing wisdom in the U.S.

Using this mindset, sponsored researchers have argued that next generation network plant skyrocketed soon after the FCC abandoned local loop unbundling and other “sharing” requirements. Let’s probe this assertion. First, recall that local loop unbundling was not something incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (“ILECs”) gave away or shared. Resellers and repackagers of local switching and routing plant paid the incumbents, albeit at a rate below what the ILECs would like to have been paid. Second I have found—deep, deep, deep in the FCC’s obscure statistics and data collection process—that compulsory rentals from incumbents to newcomers peaked at 12%, a level never close to forcing incumbents to invest in plant that they would have to make available solely to competitors. See Trends in Telephone Service (Aug. 2008), at p. 8-8; available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-284932A1.pdf.

The FCC stopped preparing this helpful source of information, but the percentage of resold ILEC lines has declined below the 8% reported in 2007 in light of the fact that rates to Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”) can exceed retail rates to end users, a price squeeze, but one the FCC and the Supreme Court in the Linkline case has no concerns.

Let’s assume that ILECs actually did increase their aggregate plant investment after the FCC abandoned local loop unbundling, bearing in mind that the Commission never required leasing of next generation plant such as dark or even lit fiber. Did deregulation cause all of the new investment? Of course not. Might the business cycle have had something to do with it? Might the cost of capital have had something to do with it? Might competitive necessity have had something to do with it? Oh and might declining market share and revenues in core business lines such as Plain Old Telephone Service have had something to do with it?

Whatever disincentive local loop unbundling imposed paled in comparison to incumbents’ need to find new revenues. Giving the ILECs due credit they have invested in next generation networks, mostly wireless and video plant for which no unbundling requirement ever applied. As to new found zeal in investing in Digital Subscriber Line services, might the ILECs want to make relatively small additional investment in already amortized copper plant, to secure some of the broadband growth market?

In a nutshell: do not buy the assertion that carriers make investment go/no decisions solely on the state of regulatory oversight. Carriers make sound business decisions, affected more by business conditions than the relatively minor impact of any FCC regulatory or deregulatory decision.

The Dark Side of Incentive Creation

Much of the debate about broadband and next generation network development focuses on the alleged need for government to create incentives for carriers to invest. Ironically much of the excuses given for the disinclination to have invested emphasizes how government created disincentives, marketplace distortion and regulatory uncertainty.

So let me get this straight. The same person or corporation, with libertarian/deregulatory instincts, rails against government intervention as likely to fail even as they assert the need for incentive creation with a straight (if not disingenuous) face.

Let’s examine incentive creation, a government activity that has become so important that we now have a new word for it: incentivize, as in the FCC needs to incentivize broadband development in rural areas by expanding the universal service program.

With all this incentivization going on it’s no wonder that arbitrage and gaming opportunities abound. The most recent example lies in the realization by rural wireline telephone companies, particularly those entrepreneurial independent telephone companies in Iowa (see http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070315/193857.shtml) that they can convert the universal service mission into cold cash. Because Congress and the FCC have created incentives for rural phone companies to wire up the hinterland, the crafty beneficiary of such incentives can earn extra cash by stimulating inbound traffic to the hinterland.

Brilliant! Funds designed to encourage telephone companies to serve expensive remote areas now flow more robustly into the coffers of the more creative incentive exploiters who offer outbound international long distance and conference calling all for the cost of the inbound call to rural Iowa. Wireless subscribers incur no additional charges for such calls made at nights and on weekends and cheap “postalized” long distance plans and calling cards offer 3-5 cents per minute calling any time of the day. The carriers handling the Iowa-bound call end up paying the Iowa telephone company as much as 7 cents a minute to terminate the call. Of course the call does not end ringing the telephone of some rural farmer in Iowa. It routes to a switch that provides second dial tone for outbound calling.

This clever money maker exploits the incentive to build out networks into the hinterland. Some of the outbound calling carriers, such as AT&T, have unilaterally decided to refuse to complete such calls. Unilaterally acting as judge, jury and executioner violates these carriers’ common carrier legal responsibilities. It also shows these carriers as asleep at the switch when the Iowa telephone company tariffed the extortionate 7 cent rate.

But most importantly the Iowa gambit shows that incentive creation has the very same potential to distort the marketplace and favor one group of stakeholders over others as the much more discussed disincentive creation.