New Publication on Space Junk and Anti-Satellite Warfare

Senior Russian government officials have threated to destroy U.S. satellites.  See https://www.livemint.com/news/world/russia-threats-to-hit-us-satellites-if-it-continues-to-11666885278398.html; https://arstechnica.com/science/2022/10/russia-threatens-a-retaliatory-strike-against-us-commercial-satellites/;https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-wests-commercial-satellites-could-be-targets-2022-10-27/.

Also, this week, the International Space Station, yet again, has needed to change orbit to avoid a possible collision with Russian space debris. See https://blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2022/10/24/space-station-maneuvers-to-avoid-orbital-debris/; https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/25/world/iss-maneuver-russia-space-junk-scn; https://www.npr.org/2022/10/26/1131374307/international-space-station-junk-debris-problem-satellite.

I am pleased to announce publication of a paper that explains how anti-satellite warfare and space junk make it more difficult for nations to agree on rules for sharing space and radio spectrum resources: 

See https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/telecommunications-policy/vol/46/issue/10.

Here’s the abstract:

This paper explains why the coordination of satellite orbits and spectrum use among nations have become more contentious and less routine.  The potential for greater risks, delays, and conflicts occurs, despite treaty-level commitments to promote the peaceful uses of outer space and efficient and equitable access to radio spectrum and satellite orbits. Heretofore, specialized sectors of the United Nations (“UN”) have worked effectively in forging multilateral consensus on these matters.

The paper explains why the coordination of satellite orbits and spectrum use among nations may become more contentious and protracted. The potential for greater risks, delays, and conflicts may occur, despite treaty-level commitments by most nations to promote the peaceful uses of outer space and access to radio spectrum and satellite orbits free of signal interference and collision risk. Heretofore, specialized sectors of the United Nations (“UN”) have worked effectively in forging multilateral consensus on these matters.

Since the onset of artificial satellite technology, the UN has created five space-related treaties covering such issues such as freedom of exploration, liability for damage caused by space objects, the prevention of harmful interference with space activities and the environment, the notification and registration of space activities, exploitation of natural resources in outer space and the settlement of disputes. The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), a specialized agency of the UN, has largely achieved the goal of preventing harmful signal interference, formulating technical standards promoting equipment compatibility, and establishing uniform operational rules of the road.  Until now, month long ITU spectrum planning conferences have reached closure on both mundane and critical matters, albeit at a slow and methodical pace. 

The paper explains how several chronic and emerging factors present challenges to the successful record of multilateral consensus building on space and spectrum issues.  The likelihood of collisions of spacecraft with other objects, including space debris and harmful signal interference has increased, because then United States has opted to make domestic satellite rules and frequency allocations in advance of final ITU consideration.  Additionally, China and Russia have sought an expansion of the ITU’s mission to include elements of Internet governance that could promote balkanization of Internet access and legitimize efforts by individual nations to surveil and control access to broadband networks.

The paper assesses whether and how UN agencies can continue to establish timely and effective policies and procedures for reducing space debris and the potential for spacecraft collisions, and preventing harmful signal interference.  The paper concludes that China, Russia, and the U.S., should renew efforts to promote collegiality, consensus building, and longstanding, shared goals.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New pub: Assessing the need for More Incentives to Stimulate Next Generation Investment

    I loath the conversion of nouns into verbs, such as party and incentivize.  Perhaps this  picadillo prompted my latest publication in Vol. 7 of I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society.

    Here's the abstract:

     Incumbent carriers often vilify the regulatory process as a drain on efficiency and an unnecessary burden in light of robust marketplace competition.  Some claim that regulation creates disincentives for investing in expensive next generation networks (“NGNs”), and even accepting subsidies for broadband development if the carrier must provide access to competitors. Without fully assessing the necessity to do so legislators, regulators and judges have accepted the premise that government must create incentives for NGN investment. Incumbent carriers in particular have seized upon the concept of uncertainty as a justification for refraining from making necessary infrastructure investments, despite the onset of declining revenues and market shares in core services. 

     In the worst case scenario, incumbent carriers secure unwarranted and premature deregulation, despite an ongoing need for governments to guard against anticompetitive practices and to promote sustainable competition.  Governments also risk providing direct financial subsidies, or creating a regulatory mechanism for indirect subsidies, to stimulate infrastructure investment when no such catalyst is necessary in light of competitive necessity.  Once a subsidy mechanism is in place, government may not easily “wean” carriers off such artificial compensation.  In rare instances government may find some key carriers unwilling to accept subsidies and in turn disinclined to pursue expedited NGN development, as is currently occurring in the U.S., because incumbent carriers do not want to provide interconnection and access to competitors, a legal duty these carriers must bear when operating as common carrier providers of telecommunications networks, but which does not apply when these carriers offer information services which include broadband.

     This paper will examine how incumbent carriers in the United States have gamed the incentive creation process for maximum market distortion and competitive advantage.  The paper suggests that the U.S. government has rewarded incumbents with artificially lower risk, insulation from competition, and partial underwriting of technology projects that these carriers would have to undertake unilaterally.   The paper also examines the FCC’s recently released National Broadband Plan with an eye toward assessing whether the Commission has properly balanced incentive creation with competitive necessity.  The paper provides recommendations on how governments can calibrate the incentive creation process for maximum consumer benefit instead of individual carrier gain.